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Imagine a situation in which an individual possesses
information which would totally exonerate a criminal defendant.
Imagine further that this individual, for fear of implicating himself
in the crime for which the defendant has been charged or an
unrelated crime, refuses to testify for the defendant by invoking his
privilege against self-incrimination. If this witness had information
that incriminated the defendant, the United States Attorney could
obtain immunity for the witness and compel him to testify.1 The
defense, however, has no such reciprocal power for a witness pos-
sessing exculpatory evidence. Instead, the defense must ask the
prosecutor to grant immunity to the witness. If the prosecution
refuses, the defense has no recourse and will lose what may be the
only available exculpatory testimony. Thus, unless the United
States Attorney accedes to the defense request to immunize the
individual, the innocent defendant may well be convicted and
sentenced.
Until recently, this Kafkaesque result has been the rule in
federal courts. The rule originated in Earl v. United States2 and has
been followed almost universally by other federal courts,3 despite
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452. tit. 11, § 201(a), 84 Stat. 926, as
amended by Pub. L. No. 95-405, 25, 92 Stat. 877: Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. 1I1, § 314(1), 92 Stat.
2678 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A 6001-05 (West Supp. 1980) (empowers United States Attorney
with approval of his superior to request immunity)). The focus of this Note is on defense witness
immunity in the federal courts. The principles, however, apply to states with similar immunity
statutes.
2. 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
3. United States v. Davis. 623 F.2d 188. 192-93 (1st Cir. 1980): United States v. Turkish, 623
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strong arguments raised by commentators 4 and judges.5
The federal immunity statute 6  requires courts to
grant immunity to a witness upon the request of the United States
Attorney when "the testimony from such individual may be
necessary to the public interest" and the individual has refused or is
likely to refuse to testify based upon his privilege against self-
incrimination. 7 The court's role in issuing the order granting
F.2d 769. 772-78 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856 (1981): United States v. Lenz, 616 F.2d
960, 962-63 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 517-20 (4th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 146-48 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Niederberger. 580 F.2d 63,
67 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Daley, 549 F.2d
469, 478-79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333.
1356 n. 115 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976): United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2cd
1079, 1080-82 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); Thompson v. Garrison, 516 F.2d 986, 988
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975); United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492.
494-95 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171,
190 (3d Cir. 1973); People v. Sapia, 41 N.Y.2d 160, 359 N.E.2d 688, 691-92, 391 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96-
97 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
4. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An EmeTent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9
IND. L. REV. 711, 815-30 (1976); Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 166-70
(1974); Note, The Fifth Amendment Testimonial Privilege as an Impediment to the Defense When Invoked by a
Potential Exculpatory Witness, 42 ALB. L, REV. 482 (1978): Note, Right of the Criminal Defendant to the
Compelled Testimony of Witnesses, 67 Cotium. L. REV. 953 (1967): Note, Separation of Powers and Defense
Witness Immunity, 66 GEO. L.J. 51 (1977); Note, A Re-examination qf Defense Witness Immunity: A New
Usefor Kastigar, 10 HARV. J. LEGis. 74 (1972); Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity
Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1266 (1978); Note. "The Public Has a Claim to Every
Man's Evidence ": The Defendant's Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1211 (1978).
5. United States v. Saettele, 585 F.2d 307, 310-14 (8th Cir. 1978) (Bright, J.. dissenting), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979); United States v, Gaither, 539 F.2d 753, 753-55 (D.C. Cir.) (statement
ofBazelon, CJ., on denial of petition for rehearing en banc), cert. denied 429 U.S. 961 (1976); United
States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955, 985 n.79 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon. C.J.. concurring in part and
dissenting in part); cf Earl v. United States, 364 F.2d 666, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Leventhal, .,
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
6. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 6002-05 (West Supp. 1980).
7. The controlling provisions are sections 6002 and 6003. Section 6002 provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or
ancillary to-
(l) A court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order
issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis
of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case,
except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to
comply with the order.
18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (West Supp. 1980). Section 6003 provides:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide
other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United States
or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court for the judicial
district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance with
subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United States attorney for such
district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other
information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this
part.
(b) A United States attorney may. with the approval of the Attorney General, the
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immunity has been interpreted to be largely ministerial.8 If the two
basic requirements 9 of the statute are satisfied and the individual
requesting immunity is authorized to do so, the court must issue
the order.
Generally, courts refuse to order the prosecution to request
immunity for defense witnesses.' 0 They refuse to do so on the
theory that courts themselves have no inherent power to grant
immunity, and to require the prosecution to request immunity for a
defense witness would violate the principle of separation of
powers." Thus, the purported lack of inherent judicial power to
grant immunity and the doctrine of separation of powers have been
used to deny defense witness immunity absent the prosecutor's
cooperation.
This Note will demonstrate that defense witness immunity is
not only constitutionally permissible without the Government's
cooperation, but in some cases may be constitutionally required.
Particular attention will be given to constitutional and statutory
developments since Earl which make a grant of defense witness
immunity possible even without the prosecutor's cooperation.
Initially, the historical development of the right to defense witness
immunity will be outlined, from its rejection in Earl to its recent
acceptance in Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith. 12 This Note will
Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General, request an
order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary
to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
18 U.S.C.A. S 6003 (West Supp. 1980).
8. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). In Ullman, the Court found the predecessor
to the current immunity statute, 18 U.S.C.A. S 3486 (West 1969), to require only that the courts
ascertain whether the statutory requirements were complied with, thus avoiding an interpretation
that would amount to an unconstitutional imposition of a non-judicial function on the federal courts.
350 U.S. at 433-34. But see Dixon, The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Federal Immunity Statutes, 23
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 501 (1955) (suggesting that federal immunity statute is unconstitutional in
violation of case and controversy requirement and doctrine of separation of powers).
9. See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
The court in Herman reviewed the legislative and judicial history of the federal immunity acts,
concluding that the court's role in granting the order is merely to find the facts on which the order is
predicated. Id. at 1200-03. The court further held that no right of judicial review exists pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act to determine whether the United States Attorney properly
concluded that the immunized testimony is necessary to the public interest. Id.
10. See United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1080-82 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948
(1976).
11. Id. The Alessio court stated that "the power to demand immunity for co-defendants, or
others whom the government might in its discretion wish to prosecute would unacceptably alter the
historic role of the Executive Branch in criminal prosecutions." Id. at 1082. See Thompson v.
Garrison, 516 F.2d 986, 988 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975) (statute places sole authority
to initiate immunity on United States Attorney; function of district court is limited to determining
whether statutory procedure has been followed); United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d
492, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975) (no one other than United States
Attorney, with approval of his superior, is authorized to request an order granting witness
immunity, and thejudicial creation of such a right is beyond the power of the courts).
12. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); see infra notes 17-58 and accompanying text.
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then demonstrate that the separation of powers doctrine need
not impede a judicial grant of defense witness immunity,
13
followed by a discussion of the constitutional bases for defense
witness immunity 14 and the arguments frequently raised against
judicially granted defense witness immunity.' 5 Finally, this Note
will focus on the implementation of the two kinds of immunity
recognized in Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith - judicially
ordered statutory immunity and judicially granted use immunity. '
6
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO DEFENSE
WITNESS IMMUNITY
In Earl v. United States,I7 in an opinion written by then-Judge
Burger, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia rejected the defendant's argument that due process
required a grant of immunity to a defense witness.18 The defendant
was implicated in a narcotics purchase by a man named Scott, who,
along with the defendant, had allegedly sold heroin
to an undercover agent.' 9 The defendant was allegedly introduced
as "Sonny. ' ' 20 Subsequently, the undercover agent arrested the
defendant, who was charged with two counts of narcotics
violations. Prior to trial, Scott pleaded guilty to charges arising out
of a separate transaction in exchange for dismissal of the charges
arising out of the transaction for which Earl was charged. 21 The
defense called Scott to testify, but he asserted his privilege against
self-incrimination. At that point the defeilse made an offer of proof
that Scott, if granted immunity, would testify that he did not know
the defendant, but that he did know someone else named
"Sonny," who resembled Earl and frequented the area of the
sale. 22 On appeal, the defense argued that the refusal of the United
States Attorney and the court to grant immunity denied the
defendant a fair trial. 23 In support of its claim, the defense relied
upon Brady v. Maryland4 for the, proposition that the refusal to grant
immunity was tantamount to suppression of favorable evidence in
13. See infra notes 59-133 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 134-202 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 203-234 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 235-338 and accompanying text.
17. 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
18. Id. at 534.




23. Id. at 534.
24. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Brady Court held "that the suppression by the prosecution of
DEFENSE WITNESS IMMUNITY
violation of the due process clause. 25 The court rejected this
contention, holding that the prosecution had not suppressed
favorable evidence because it had not affirmatively withheld the
witness or concealed evidence. 26 The court further asserted that the
judiciary did not have the power to compel the Government to
grant immunity, nor did the judiciary possess the inherent power to
grant immunity for defense witnesses. The court did, however,
note that Congress could remedy the problem by conferring on the
defendant a right to compel testimony comparable to that provided
the Government under the immunity statute.
27
The Earl court stated in a footnote that a different question
would be presented if the Government grants immunity to its own
witnesses in exchange for their testimony, but declines to seek
immunity for defense witnesses. 28 That situation, in the words of
the Earl court, "would vividly dramatize an argument on behalf
of Earl that the statute as applied denied him due process." 29 When
faced with that situation, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Alessio,30 declined
to find a due process violation, resting its decision on the doctrine
of separation of powers and deferring to the broad prosecutorial
discretion enjoyed by the executive branch of government.3 1 The
court, in examining the actual impact of the Government's refusal
to grant immunity to the defense witnesses, determined that the
testimony sought to be elicited would be cumulative. Therefore, the
court concluded that the refusal to grant the requested immunity
did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 32
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87.
25. 361 F.2d at 534.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 534 n. 1.
29. Id. (emphasis in original). Subsequent decisions have also acknowledged potential due
process violations in situations in which the Government has requested immunity for its witnesses,
but has refused to seek immunity for defense witnesses. See United States v. Bautista, 509 F.2d 675,
677 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 926 (1975); United States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524, 532-33 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975).
30. 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
31. United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1081-82 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948
(1976).
32. Id. at 1082. In United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1978), the court also
rejected a due process challenge based on theGovernment's refusal to request immunity for a defense
witness after having granted immunity to two of its own witnesses. Id. at 561. While recognizing a
potential due process claim based on the footnote in Earl, the court in Carnan concluded that the de-
fendant had not been prejudiced by the Government's refusal to grant immunity to a potential
defense witness because the defendant by failing to call the witness to the stand had not demonstrated
any need for immunity. Id. According to the court, if the witness were not called to the stand, no one
could be sure that he would, in fact, assert his right against self-incrimination. Id. Similarly, in
United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979), the court
rejected a due process challenge when the Government immunized its own witnesses, but refused to
grant immunity to the defense witnesses. Id. at 1203-05. The court held that, in order to justify
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After the decision in Earl, Congress amended the federal
immunity statute. 33 Where the former statute required that any
immunity granted would be "transactional," the statute now
permits the granting of more limited "use" immunity. 34 Despite
the amendment, most courts continue to refuse to recognize the
right to defense witness immunity. 35 These courts rely on the
doctrine of separation of powers as the dominant rationale for their
refusal to recognize the right.
36
reversal on such a claim, the defense would have to show that the Government's decisions were made
with the deliberate intention ofdistorting the judicial factfinding process. Id. at 1204.
33. The federal immunity statute was amended by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.
Seesupra note I. The current version of the immunity statute provides in relevant part as follows:
JN]o testimony or other information compelled under the order [of immunity] (or any
information directly or indirectly derivedfrom such testimony or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for prejury, giving a
false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (West Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
The statute at issue in Earl, section 1406 of Title 18 of the United States Code, read in pertinent
part as follows:
But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiturefor or
on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having
claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, nor
shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding....
18 U. S.C. § 1406 (3) (1964) (emphasis added). /
34. "Use immunity," found to be coextensive with the scope of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, requires only that the testimony of an immunized witness not be used
against him directly in a subsequent prosecution for the matter about which he is required to testify,
or used derivatively to obtain evidence for future prosecution. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 449-53 (1972). "Transactional immunity," the form mandated by the federal immunity act
under which Earl v. United States was decided, precludes subsequent prosecution for the transaction to
which the witness testifies. Id. See Mykkeltvedt, To Supplant the Fifth Amendment's Right Against
Compulsory Self-Incrimination: The Supreme Court and Federal Grants of Witness Immunity, 30 MERCER L.
REv. 633 (1979).
Some states continue to require transactional immunity. See, e.g., N.D. CENT, CODE § 31-01-09
(1976):
After complying, and if, but for this section, [the witnessi would have been privileged
to withhold the answer given or evidence produced by him, that person shall not be
prosecuted or subject to penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter, or thing concerning which, in accordance with the order, he gave answer or
produced evidence.
Id.
In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the United States Supreme Court upheld the
1970 Act which amended the federal immunity statute to provide for use rather than transactional
immunity. Id. at 462. This decision and its effect on the right to defense witness immunity will be
discussed infra at notes 119-133 and accompanying text.
35. E.g., United States v. Lenz, 616 F.2d 960. 962-63 (6th Cir. 1980). The Lenz court
specifically rejected defendant's contention that the Supreme Court's acceptance of use immunity in
Kastigar made it possible to grant immunity to defense witnesses. Id. at 962-63.
36. Id. The defendant in Lenz contended that with the acceptance of use immunity by the
Supreme Court in Kastigar the government no longer had a legitimate reason to deny immunity to
defense witnesses, Id. at 962. Thus, the defendant argued that he had a compulsory process right to
defense witness immunity. Id. The court responded by noting:
[Ulse immunity is a statutory creation. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 commits the decision to
grant or den' immunity to the sole discretion of the executive branch of the
Government, and the courts have no power to compel the United States Attorney to
immunize defense witnesses....
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Recently, some courts have been receptive to the need for
defense witness immunity. For example, in United States v.
Morrison,37 the court ordered the Government to grant immunity to
a defense witness when the Assistant United States Attorney
threatened to prosecute her if she testified on the defendant's
behalf.38 The court also ruled that if the Government did not
request immunity, a judgment of acquittal should be entered. 39
Prosecutorial misconduct which resulted in the loss of potentially
exculpatory evidence because the defense witness invoked her
privilege against self-incrimination necessitated the court's
action. 40 Although asserting the power to dismiss the charges if the
Government refused to comply with the order to request immunity
for the defense witness, the court in Morrison nonetheless
acknowledged that only the Government could request immunity
and that courts lacked inherent power to grant immunity absent
such a request.
4 1
In United States v. Herman, 42 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit expanded the potential for a right to defense
witness immunity when, in addition to acknowledging the right to
court-ordered immunity43 established in Morrison, it recognized the
possibility of an inherent authority to confer a "judicially fashioned
immunity" upon a witness whose testimony is essential to an
effective defense. 44 The court-granted immunity alluded to in
Herman emanates from the due process right to present clearly
exculpatory evidence recognized in Chambers v. Mississippi. 4 5 The
Herman court, however, recognizing the difficult issues raised by a
grant of judicially fashioned use immunity, declined to exercise its
inherent power, awaiting a case in which the issue was squarely
presented to the court.
46
While use immunity for defense witnesses may well be desirable. . . . its
proponents must address their arguments to Congress, not the courts. We find no
authority for it in the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment.
Id. at 962-63.
37. 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
38. United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 225-26, 229 (3d Cir. 1976).
39. Id. at 229.
40. Id. at 226.
41. Id. at 228-29.
42. 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
43. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1203-04 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913
(1979).
44. Id at 1204.
45. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Chambers v. Mississippi and its effect on the right to defense witness
immunity will be discussed infra at notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
46. 589 F.2d at 1204-05. The Herman court specifically stated:
The existence vel non of such immunity power, and the standards which should govern
its invocation and exercise, raise a host of difficult issues. It may be, for example, that
such grants of immunity would on some occasions unduly interfere with important
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That opportunity presented itself a little over a year later. In
Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 47 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held for the first time that not only
may a court require the prosecution to request defense witness
immunity, but under certain circumstances the court itself may
grant immunity to enable a defense witness to testify free of the fear
of subsequent prosecution based on that testimony.
4 8
In Smith, the United States Attorney refused to seek the
immunization of a witness who, based on his prior statements to the
police, could have given testimony exonerating three of four
defendants convicted of robbery. 49 The witness, Sanchez, was a
juvenile at the time the crime was committed, and thus was under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile authorities in the Virgin
Island Attorney General's office. 50 The individual responsible in
that office had offered to grant Sanchez use immunity, but as a
matter of prosecutorial courtesy conditioned his offer on the
consent of the United States Attorney. The United States Attorney,
without explanation, refused to consent, and when requested by the
defense, declined to seek a grant of immunity for Sanchez.
51
In reversing the convictions of the three defendants who stood
to be exonerated by Sanchez's testimony and remanding for an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether due process required that
Sanchez be granted immunity, the court set out standards to be
applied for both the court-ordered immunity previously recognized
in Morrison and the judicially fashioned use immunity discussed in
Herman.
52
The Smith court indicated that in order to establish a due
process right to court-ordered statutory immunity the defense must
establish at an evidentiary hearing that the witness's testimony
would be relevant and that the actions of the United States
Attorney in refusing to seek the requested immunity were taken
with the deliberate intention of distorting the fact-finding process.
53
interests of the prosecution. Because the issue of inherent judicial power to grant use
immunity was not raised in the district court, and the parties have not discussed it in
the briefs or argument before us, we are reluctant to address it here .... If such
inherent power is to be recognized and standards formulated for its exercise, that task
should be performed in a case where the issue was presented by the defendant, and
perhaps by the court sitting in banc.
Id.
47. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
48. Governrmient of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 968-72 (3d Cir. 1980).
49. Id. at 967.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 969-72. 974.
53. Id. at 969.
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The grant of judicially fashioned use immunity, however, does not
depend on prosecutorial misconduct, and by definition need not
await executive action. 54 The Smith court emphasized that the right
to judicially granted use immunity is designed to protect the
defendant's due process right to "clearly exculpatory evidence
necessary to present an effective defense. ,,55 Because of the unique
nature of the remedy and with due deference to separation of
powers, the Smith court limited grants of judicial immunity to the
following conditions: "[I]mmunity must be properly sought in the
district court; the defense witness must be available to testify; the
proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory; the testimony
must be essential; and there must be no strong governmental
interests which countervail against a grant of immunity."
56
Although other circuits have not yet adopted the position
taken by the Third Circuit in Smith,5 7 those courts which have
discussed the issue have implicitly recognized that in certain
situations the principle of essential fairness embodied in the due
process clause may require that defense witnesses be granted
immunity. 58 The decisions of the Third Circuit culminating i.n
54. Id. at 969-70.
55. Id. at 971. The Smith court found that the due process right to defense witness immunity
emanated from the Brady-Chambers line of cases. Id. at 970-71. The court noted, however, that the
remedy of a new trial mandated by those cases was insufficient in the context of defense witness
immunity:
While the constitutional violation in this case is the same as the violation found in
the Chambers and Brady genre of cases - i.e., depriving a defendant of clearly
exculpatory evidence necessary to present an effective defense - a new trial such as
was provided in those cases would be insufficient to remedy the *constitutional
infringement which may have occurred here. Any remedy in the present case must
take into account the fact that a retrial would be meaningless unless the evidence in
issue may be compelled. That compulsion can only be accomplished in the context of a
case such as the instant one, by granting immunity to a defense witness, once it is
established, however, that the conditions for such a remedy have been satisfied.
Id. at 971.
56. Id. at 972 (footnote omitted). Interestingly, the court found its recognition of judicially
fashioned use immunity not to be inconsistent with its previous decisions which had apparently
rejected the viability of court-granted immunity. For example, in both United States v. Rocco, 587
F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979), and United States v. Niederberger, 580
F.2d 63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1978), the court had stated that 'a trial court has no
authority to provide use immunity for a defense witness." 587 F.2d at 147; 580 F.2d at 67. The court
in Smith, however, distinguished this apparent rejection of defense witness immunity:
Neither United States v. Rocco . . .nor United States v. Niederberger . . .discuss the subject
ofjudicially fashioned immunity for essential defense witnesses. Hence, they do not bear
on our holding here. Insofar as both opinions discuss statutory immunity .. .neither
case was decided in a context involving prosecutorial misconduct or deliberate
distortion of the trial process by the government. Therefore their authority, in respect
to immunity, is limited and in no way detracts from either the statutory immunity or
the judicial immunity analysis in which we have here indulged.
615 F.2d 972 n. II (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856
(1981).
58. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 777 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856
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Smith have thus articulated the constitutional underpinnings of a
right to defense witness immunity, and have demonstrated that the
doctrine of separation of powers need not be an insuperable barrier
to recognition of the right.
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND DEFENSE WITNESS
IMMUNITY
The United States Constitution divides the powers of the
federal government into three separate spheres: The legislature has
the authority to make laws,5 9 the judiciary the power to hear and
decide cases, 60 and the executive the duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed. 61 The issue of defense witness immunity brings
all three branches of the federal government into potential conflict.
The judiciary is implicated both in ordering the grant of
immunity62 and in the trial itself. The legislature is involved
by virtue of having enacted the federal immunity statute, 63 and the
executive must decide whether to request immunity, 64 or to
prosecute at all.
65
The immunity statute requires that the request for witness
immunity originate with the United States Attorney. 66 This
provision has been interpreted to preclude judicial grants of
statutory immunity absent a prosecutorial request, 67  thus
representing a legislative determination that the executive, not the
judiciary, possesses the power to seek witness immunity. A judicial
grant of immunity, therefore, potentially impinges not only on
executive prerogative, but on the power of Congress as well. The
(1981) ("Without precluding the possibility of some circumstances not now anticipated, we simply
do not find in the Due Process Clause a general requirement that defense witness immunity must be
ordered wherever it seems fair to grant it."); United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 189, 193 (1st Cir.
1980) ("We need not decide to what extent we agree with [Smith and Morisonl since no such
circumstances exist in the instant case."); United States v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054, 1064 (2d Cir.
1980) ("This Circuit has followed the general rule that the United States ordinarily need not grant
statutory immunity to a defense witness, although . . . under 'extraordinary circumstances,' due
process may require that the government confer use immunity on a witness for the defendant. ").
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 1. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." Id.
60. Id. art. III, § 2. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States and Treaties .... " Id.
61. Id. art. 1I, § 3. "[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed .
Id.
62. See 18 U.S.C.A. 5 6003(a) (West Supp. 1980) (court shall issue order requiring individual to
testify).
63. 18 U.S.C.A. § 6001-05 (West Supp. 1980).
64. Id. at § 6003.
65. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (our legal system vests broad discretion
in prosecuting attorneys).
66. 18 U.S.C.A. S 6003 (West Supp. 1980) ("the United States district court . .. shall issue...
upon the request of the United States attorney . . . an order requiring such individual to give
testimony").
67. See supra note 3 and cases cited therein.
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ultimate conflict, however, is between the judiciary, with its power
to control the trial of criminal cases, and the executive, with its
broad prosecutorial discretion.
A. THE FUNCTION OF THE COURT AND THE PROSECUTOR UNDER
THE FEDERAL IMMUNITY STATUTE
Without statutory authorization neither the courts68 nor the
prosecution 69  possesses an inherent power to grant witness
immunity. The federal immunity statute gives the prosecutor sole
authority to seek an order for immunity.70 He must, however,
request a court order granting witness immunity.7' The court
enjoys no discretion in granting or denying the requested order. 72
Its duty is simply to ascertain whether the requirements of the
statute have been satisfied.7 3 Therefore, under the present federal
immunity provision,7 4 the United States Attorney alone has the
power to secure immunity for any witness-be it for the
prosecution or the defense.
Before immunity may be requested, however, the prospective
witness must refuse to testify or provide the desired information by
invoking his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
7 5
While the role of the court in actually ordering immunity may be
limited to determining that the requirements of the statute have
been complied with, 76 its role in determining whether the fifth
amendment privilege has been validly asserted is not so restricted. 7
7
The court must determine that the person claiming the privilege
indeed has a right to assert it 78 and that under the circumstances he
68. Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
69. Id.; Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878).
70. 18 U.S.C.A. 5 6003 (West Supp. 1980).
71. Id.
72. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 432-34 (1956).
73. Id. A challenge to the predecessor of the current statute was made on the ground that to
allow the court to approve the application for the grant of immunity was tantamount to the exercise
of a veto power over the decision of the United States Attorney, and thus constituted the exercise of
non-judicial power by an Article III court in violation of the principle of separation of powers. In re
Ullman, 128 F. Supp. 617, 624 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom., Ullman v. United States, 221 F.2d 760
(2d Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). The Supreme Court, however, rebuffed this challenge by
construing the statute to vest no discretion in the court, thus avoiding the constitutional issue. 350
U.S. at 433-34 (adopting the reasoning of the federal district court judge).
74. 18 U.S.C.A. S 6003 (West Supp. 1980).
75. Id. (immunity order requires "individual to give testimony or provide other information
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination").
76. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 432-34 (1956).
77. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951) ("It is for the court to say whether
his silence is justified . . and to require him to answer if 'it clearly appears to the court that he is
mistaken.' ").
78. The privilege against self-incrimination is purely personal and cannot be asserted by or on
behalf of a corporation, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944), or an unincorporated
association. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 372 (1951). Moreover, the person desiring its
protection must claim it, as it is deemed waived unless invoked. Id at 370-71. The Constitution itself
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
has validly invoked it. 19
In the context of defense witness immunity, the problems
surrounding a valid invocation of the privilege against self-
incrimination take on special importance. On one hand, in order to
successfully obtain a grant of immunity for its witness the defense
must demonstrate that the witness validly has invoked the
privilege. On the other hand, if the defense is unsuccessful in
obtaining immunity for its witnesses, it will want to show that their
privilege is limited in order to obtain at least some favorable
evidence.
Initially, in the context of defense witness immunity, it may be
crucial to a valid claim for immunity that the witness will, in fact,
invoke his fifth amendment privilege. 80 Failure to call the witness
and demonstrate that the witness would indeed invoke his fifth
amendment privilege has been held to be a prerequisite to a request
for defense witness immunity. 8' Thus, to ensure a proper
foundation for appeal, the defense must demonstrate the need for
does not forbid the asking of incriminating questions, and, absent a valid claim of privilege, the duty
to testify remains absolute. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (grand jury testimony).
Once a person has been convicted, Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 513 (1960), or
pleaded guilty to a crime, Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 188 (1963), the privilege no longer
remains. Cf( United States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212, 1218 (3d Cir. 1978) (despite a guilty plea,
the privilege will remain with respect to crimes to which the guilty plea does not pertain). Similarly,
the privilege does not exist with respect to a crime for which prosecution is barred by the statute of
limitations. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896). Moreover, a grant of immunity,
coextensive with the privilege, will compel the witness to testify despite a claim of privilege. Zicarelli
v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472, 475 (1972).
79. While the privilege protects against "real dangers, not remote and speculative
possibiltties," Ltcarelli v. NewJersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972), it is validly
invoked not only if the answers themselves would support a conviction, but also if those answers
would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the witness. Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950). Ultimately, the
court must determine whether the privilege is validly asserted and to require the witness to answer if
it clearly appears that his assertion of the validity of his claim is mistaken. 341 U.S. at 486. "The
witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would
incriminate himself - his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination.' Id. In
determining the validity of the claim of privilege, "it need only be evident from the implications of
the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an
explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could
result." Id. at 486-87.
Furthermore, courts have held that the witness himself must assert the privilege on the stand
and under oath, and that it may not be invoked by an attorney as his surrogate. State v. Jennings,
126 N.J. Super. 70, 312 A.2d 864, 867 (1972), cert. denied, 70 N.J. 141, 358 A.2d 188 (1976). This
rule, however, does not apply to a defendant in a criminal case, because of the likelihood that the jury
will infer guilt from the assertion of the privilege. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 96 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977). No ritualistic formula or talismanic phrase is required in
order to invoke the privilege. See, e.g., Empsak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955) (where
petitioner based his refusal to answer on "primarily the first amendment, supplemented by the
fifth," the privilege had been validly asserted).
80. See United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1978). "Even though the government
did grant immunity to two of its own witnesses, Carman cannot claim that the refusal to grant
immunity to Hoffe prcjudiced his trial when he failed to call Hoffe to the stand to establish any need
for immunity." Id. at 561 (emphasis in original).
81. Id.; United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1978) (defense witness
immunity properly denied where defense made no affirmative showing that either of the witnesses
would have refused to testify if called as defense witnesses).
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immunity by showing that the favorable testimony will not be
forthcoming without a grant of immunity. 1
2
Additionally, while the guilty plea of a codefendant or
accomplice generally may abrogate that person's privilege,
83 it will
not automatically do so. 84 For example, the accomplice in Earl v.
United States,8 5 although having pleaded guilty, was nevertheless
deemed to have validly invoked his privilege, 86 because the
accomplice had pleaded guilty to a separate transaction.
8 7
Therefore, while the role of the court under the immunity
statute has been deemed to be essentially ministerial in terms of
ascertaining whether the requirements of the immunity statute
have been met, its role in determining the existence and validity of
the witness's assertion of his fifth amendment privilege is
potentially more substantial. This enhanced role of the court
affords both an obstacle to obtaining defense witness immunity and
an opportunity to obtain favorable defense evidence should the
court refuse to grant immunity to the defense witness.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF A FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO THE DOCTRINE
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
Because the doctrine of separation of powers has formed the
82. Although assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination by the witness or a likely
refusal to testify based upon the privilege is a prerequisite to a request for witness immunity, 18
U.S.C.A. S 6003 (b)(2) (West Supp. 1980), and the witness ordinarily must take the stand to claim
,the privilege, these determinations are often made outside the presence of the jury. See, e.g., United
States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40, 43-44 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976) (suggesting
procedure for trial court to conduct inquiry into claim of privilege outside of jury's presence). If the
court determines in its voir dire of the witness that the privilege may validly be comprehensively
claimed, it may excuse him entirely from testifying. United States v..Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211
(1st Cir. 1973). In such cases, the defendant has no right to call the witness for the sole purpose of
benefiting from inferences the jury may draw from his assertion of the privilege. Id. See also United
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 909 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979); United States
v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485, 487 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. LaCouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1240
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053 (1974). Similarly, if the government calls a witness it knows will
invoke the fifth amendment privilege, prejudicial error may result. United States v. Beechum, 582
F.2d at 908.
In determining whether the witness has validly invoked his privilege, courts sometimes have
refused to entertain a blanket assertion of the privilege, and have passed on the validity of the
privilege with'respect to each question asked. United States v. Bautista, 509 F.2d 675, 678 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). See generally Note, The Fifth Amendment Testimonial Privilege as an
Impediment to the Defense When Invoked by a Potential Exculpatory Witness, 42 ALB. L. REV. 482 (1978). To
aid in this matter courts have suggested examining witnesses in the presence of the prosecution and
defense, but outside the presence of the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40, 43-44
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976). At least one court has suggested the possibility of an in
camera examination to establish the proper scope of the privilege. United States v. Melchor Moreno,
536 F.2d 1042, 1047-48 (5th Cir. 1976).
83. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 188 (1963).
84. See United States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212, 1218 (3d Cir. 1978) (waiver of fifth
amendment rights applies solely to the crime to which the guilty plea pertains, not to other crimes for
which witness may still be subject to prosecution).
85. 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir, 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
86. Id. at 532.
87. Id.
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basis for courts' refusal to recognize a right to defense witness
immunity,88s it is important to determine whether that doctrine and
its corollary, broad prosecutorial discretion, continue to provide
legitimate obstacles to recognition of the right to defense witness
immunity. Although the Constitution does not explicitly enunciate
the separation of powers doctrine, it clearly envisions three separate
branches of government.8 9 Federal courts traditionally have given
great deference to the executive as prosecutor. 90 Thus, in criminal.
matters, the doctrine of separation of powers confers broad
prosecutorial discretion on the executive. 9 1 In United States v. Cox, 91
the court characterized this discretion as follows:
Although as a member of the bar, the attorney for the
United States is an officer of the court, he is nevertheless
an executive official of the Government, and it is as an
officer of the executive department that he exercises a
discretion as to whether or not there shall be a prosecution
in a particular case. It follows, as an incident of the
constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are
not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary
powers of the attorneys of the United States in their
control over criminal prosecutions. 93
Courts have construed this discretion not only to confer on the
prosecutor broad latitude in initiating or refusing to initiate
criminal prosecutions, 94 but also in prosecuting under the heavier
of two criminal statutes proscribing the same conduct, 95 in plea
bargaining, 96 and in granting immunity to witnesses. 97
Prosecutorial discretion, however, is not unbounded. The
doctrine of separation of powers does not envision separate
88, Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. dented, 388 U.S. 921 (1967). See
generally Note, Separation of Powers and Defense Witness Immunity, 66 G EO. L.J. 51 (1977).
89. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928).
90. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357, 365 (1978); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868).
91. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
92. Id.
93. Id. (footnote omitted). In Cox, the court held that a United States Attorney could not be
compelled by the court to sign a duly returned grand jury indictment, thereby initiating criminal
proceedings. Id. at 172.
94. Id. See also Inmates ofAtttica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379-82 (2d
Cir. 1973) (courts have no authority to interfere in decision not to prosecute).
95. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-29 (1979) (federal gun control statutes). See
also Berra v. United States, 351 U.S, 131, 134 (1956) (two tax evasion statutes construed to prohibit
identical conduct).
96. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (upholding validity of plea
bargaining). But see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (prosecutor is bound by promises
made in exchange for guilty plea).
97. Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
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branches of government totally independent of one another.9 8 The
roles of the executive and the judiciary inevitably overlap in federal
criminal prosecutions. For example, as the final arbiter of the
Constitution,99 the judiciary must ensure that the prosecution
exercises its discretion within the bounds of the Constitution. Thus,
a criminal defendant may raise a claim of selective prosecution or
selective enforcement if the decision to prosecute is based upon an
unjustifiable criterion, such as race, religion, or another arbitrary
classification. 100
While it would be an overstatement to suggest that in recent
years the doctrine of separation of powers has been abandoned in
the criminal trial context,1oi recent developments suggest that
courts have adopted a flexible' 1 2 approach to the doctrine of
98. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
99. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
100. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 n.9 (1979); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,
456 (1962). See also United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1973) (prosecutor cannot
discriminate based on exercise of free speech).
101. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). In Bordenkircher, the Court, while
recognizing the constitutional limitations on prosecutorial discretion, nonetheless upheld the exercise
of that discretion by a state prosecutor who carried out his threat to have the defendant reindicted
under the stricter habitual criminal act ifhe did not plead guilty to a lesser charge. Id. at 358-59, 365.
In United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979), the Court upheld, as a valid exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, a prosecution decision to proceed under the stricter federal gun control
statute when two different statutes proscribed the same conduct. Id. at 124-25. In Marshall v.
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980), the Court reiterated the general rule that "[olur legal system has
traditionally accorded wide discretion to criminal prosecutors in the enforcement process." Id. at
1616.
102. In upholding the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act against a
challenge based upon grounds that it violated the separation of powers doctrine, the Court, in Nixon
v. Administrator ofGen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441-46 (1977), espoused a flexible approach to the
doctrine:
[Tihe more pragmatic, flexible approach of Madison in the Federalist Papers and later
of Mr. Justice Story was expressly affirmed by this Court only three years ago in
United States v. Nixon 1418 U.S. 683, 1974]. There the same broad argument
concerning the separation of powers was made by appellant in the context of
opposition to a subpoena duces tecum of the Watergate Special Prosecutor for certain
Presidential tapes and documents of value to a pending criminal investigation.
Although acknowledging that each branch of the Government has the duty initially to
interpret the Constitution for itself, and that its interpretation of its powers is due great
respect from the other branches, 418 U.S. at 703, the Court squarely rejected the
argument that the Constitution contemplates a complete division of authority between
the three branches. Rather, the unanimous Court essentially embraced Mr. Justice
Jackson's view, expressed in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
"In designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating
the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the
Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers
were not intended to operate with absolute independence. ' 418 U.S. at 707 (emphasis
supplied).
Like the District Court, we therefore find that appellant's argument rests upon an
"archaic view of the separation of powers as requiring three airtight departments of
government," 408 F. Supp., at 342. Rather, in determining whether the Act disrupts.
the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the
extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 711-712. Only
where the potential for disruption is present must we then determine whether that
impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the
constitutional authority of Congress. Ibid.
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separation of powers in general, 103 and in the criminal trial context
in particular. 10 4 The leading Supreme Court decision in this
regard, United States v. Nixon10 5 exemplifies this flexible approach.
In Nixon, the Supreme Court recognized that concerns for the
principle of separation of powers must give way in the criminal trial
context.1 0 6 Even such a weighty concern as executive privilege can-
not be allowed to thwart the truth-finding function of a criminal
trial. In this regard, the Court stated:
We have elected to employ an adversary system of
criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues
before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant
facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and
comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be
defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or
speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of
the judicial system and public confidence in the system
depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the
framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice
is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that
compulsory process be available for the production of
evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the
defense. 1
0 7
The Court further noted that the defendant's sixth
amendment rights of confrontation and compulsory process, as
well as the due process guarantee, required the production of all
Id. at 442-43 (footnotes omitted).
103. See e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566-68 (1975) (decision ofSecretary of Labor
not to bring a civil action to set aside union election pursuant to the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959 is subject to judicial review). See generally I K. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE S 1.09 (1958).
104. See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 971 (1976).
In Cowan, the court applied a flexible approach to the doctrine of separation of powers to conclude,
based on rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that a court may review a United
States Attorney's decision to dismiss a pending prosecution. Id. at 513. The Cowan court recognized
that the executive retains absolute discretion to initiate a prosecution, but once the prosecution has
been initiated, its exercise is subject to judicial review. Id. In addition to relying on the flexible
approach to separation of powers problems espoused by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the court in Cowan relied on a previous United States Supreme Court
decision, Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 259 (1942), in which the Court asserted its power to
review a case despite the government's confession of error. The Young Court noted that "Itihe public
interest that a result be reached which promotes a well-ordered society is foremost in every criminal
proceeding. That interest is entrusted to our consideration and protection as well as to that of the
enforcing officers." 315 U.S. at 259. The Cowan court, however, declined to uphold the district
court's refusal to dismiss the pending charges and to appoint a special prosecutor. 524 F.2d at 513-
15. Cowan, nevertheless, clearly stands for the proposition that once criminal proceedings have been
instituted, the discretion of the prosecutor is circumscribed and reviewable by the courts.
105. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
106. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-13 (1974).
107. Id. at 709.
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relevant and admissible evidence. 10  Moreover, a generalized
assertion of executive privilege could not counterbalance the
specific need for evidence in a criminal trial. 10 9 Thus, Nixon not
only lends support for the right to defense witness immunity in the
face of an assertion of a constitutional privilege," 0 but broadly
stated, it mandates a reevaluation of the separation of powers
doctrine in the criminal trial context. After Nixon, blanket
assertions of prosecutorial discretion should no longer serve to
shield testimony of recalcitrant witnesses, for as the Court noted,
"Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every
man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed,
for they are in derogation of the search for truth."" '
In other contexts, the Court has recognized that a criminal
trial is not a poker game, but a search for the truth, 112 and that
rules, whether legislatively" 13 or judicially"14 created, will be
construed to avoid the suppression of relevant and reliable
evidence. " 5 To limit the application of rules which restrict access to
admissible evidence to one side only furthers the image that
criminal trials are, in fact, poker games, albeit played with a
stacked deck. 1 6 The Supreme Court has repeatedly cut back on the
application of the exclusionary rule because the cost of deterrence,
in the form of the loss of reliable evidence, is too great." 7 The
underlying basis for this retrenchment is that the exclusionary rule
impairs the truth-finding function of criminal trials."" The
108. Id. at 711.
109. Id. at 713.
110. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
111. 418U.S. at710.
112. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 (1973) (pre-trial discovery).
113. Id. at 477-79 (holding invalid state notice-of-alibi statute which required defendant to
notify prosecution of prospective alibi witnesses, but which imposed no reciprocal duty upon the
state to reveal its rebuttal witnesses).
114. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In Powell, the Court acknowledged the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule as a Judicially created remedy designed primarily to deter
unlawful police conduct. Id. at 482-84.
115. Id. at 490. The Court in Powell described the effect of the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule as follows:
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at trial and on direct review are
well known: the focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, are
diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central
concern in a criminal proceeding. Moreover, the physical evidence sought to be
excluded is typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. . . . Application of the rule thus deflects the
truthfinding process and often frees the guilty.
Id. at 489-90 (footnotes omitted).
116. The United States Supreme Court has itself echoed this concern when it stated, "The State
may not insist that trials be run as a 'search for truth' so far as defense witnesses are concerned, while
maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own witnesses." Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475
(1973) (footnote omitted).
117. 428 U.S. at 490.
118. Id.
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inability to obtain immunity for witnesses with potentially
exculpatory evidence similarly impedes the truth-finding function.
Extension of the right of immunity to the defense, at least in cases
in which the evidence is crucial to the defense and to a fair
adjudication of guilt or innocence, is therefore consistent with the
Court's concern for an unencumbered truth-finding function in
criminal trials.
C. KASTIGAR AND DEFENSE WITNESS IMMUNITY
Prior to the enactment of the current federal witness immunity
statute, a grant of immunity insulated a witness from future
prosecution for any transactions relating to his compelled
testimony. 119 A grant of transactional immunity was therefore
tantamount to an exercise of the prosecutor's discretion not to
prosecute the immunized witness. Because the decision to initiate a
criminal prosecution is a matter within the absolute discretion of
the prosecutor,1 20 the doctrine of separation of powers precludes a
grant of judicial immunity which completely bars future
prosecution of the witness. Prior to the enactment of the current
federal statute, courts understandably felt constrained by the
doctrine of separation of powers from granting immunity or
ordering a grant of immunity to defense witnesses. 121
In 1970, Congress amended the immunity statute to provide
for "use" rather than "transactional" immunity. 12 2 Language in
United States Supreme Court cases had suggested that, in order to
withstand constitutional scrutiny, an immunity statute must
provide full transactional irnmunity.' 23  The issue of the
constitutionality of the "use" immunity statute was presented in
119. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 451-52 (1972) (historical perspective of
immunity acts). See also Note, The Federal 47itness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the
Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YAM.F L.J. 1568, 1611-12 (1963) (collecting various federal immunity acts).
120. See United States v. Cowan. 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
"The Executive remains the absolute judge of whether a prosecution should be initiated..." Id at
513.
121. See, e.g., Earl v. United States. 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921
(1967).
122. See supra note 1. See also notes 33-34 and accompanying text for the distinction between
"use" and "transactional" immunity.
123. See Counselman v. Hitchcock. 142 U.S. 547 (1892). In Counselman, the Court held invalid a
statutory grant of use immurity, noting that it "afford[edl no protection against the use of compelled
testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a knowledge of the details ofa crime, and of sources of
information which may supply other means ofconvicting the witness or party.'" Id. at 586.
The Counselman dictum was repeated in subsequent decisions, most notably Albertson v.
Subsersive Activities Control Board. 382 U.S. 70 (1965), in which the Court declared invalid the
registration requirement of the Subversive Activities Control Act. The Court noted that the
immunity provision of that statute, which required Communist Party members to register under
certain circumstances, did not "preclude the use of the admission as an investigatory lead," a use
barred by the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 80. The Counselman dictum
was thus thought to require transactional immunity.
204
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Kastigar v. United States, 1 4  and the Supreme Court upheld the
amended federal witness immunity statute against a fifth
amendment challenge. 12 5 The Court held that the statutory grant of
"use" and "derivative use" immunity was coextensive with the
privilege against self-incrimination. 12 6 In so holding, the Court
dismissed as dicta language in prior cases which had suggested that
an immunity statute must afford absolute immunity against
prosecution for the offense to which the question relates. 2 7 Kastigar
therefore dispelled the notion that the Constitution required full
transactional immunity.
Enactment of the use immunity statute and its approval in
Kastigar recasts the entire issue of defense witness immunity. 28 A
judicial grant of immunity to a defense witness or an order
124. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
125. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
126. Id. The Court in Kastiear, in explaining why the immunity statute was coextensive with the
fifth amendment privilege, reasoned:
The statute's explicit proscription of the use in any criminal case of "testimony or
other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information)" is consonant with Fifth
Amendment standards. We hold that such immunity from use and derivative use is
coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is
sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. While a grant of immunity
must afford protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege, it need not
be broader. Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution
for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness
considerably broader protection then does the Fifth Amendment privilege. The
privilege has never been construed to mean that one who invokes it cannot
subsequently be prosecuted. Its sole concern is to afford protection against being
"forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of 'penalties affixed to... criminal
acts.' " Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived
directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this protection. It prohibits the prosecutorial
authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures
that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction ofcriminal penalties on the witness.
Id. (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
127. Id. at 454-55, 455 n.39. The Kastigar Court dismissed as dictum language in Counselman
v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), to the effect that "a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford
absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates." Id. at
586.
The Court in Kastiar, however, refused to recognize such a requirement. Instead, the Court
acknowledged the validity of Counselman and Albertson to the extent that they held that use immunity,
without a restriction on the derivative use of the witness's testimony, was constitutionally invalid.
The Court concluded, however, that immunity from use and derivative use of the witness's
testimony was coextensive with the protection afforded by the fifth amendment and therefore
constitutionally permissible. 406 U.S. at 453.
In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), the Court
alluded to the permissibility of use and derivative use immunity when, in recognizing that a state
grant of immunity was effective against federal prosecution and vice versa, it stated that "a state
witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless
the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with
a criminal prosecution against him." Id. at 79 (emphasis added). Thus, the "use plus fruits"
immunity recognized by the Court in Murphy became the "use plus derivative use" immunity which
was statutorily implemented in 1970 and found to be constitutional in Kastigar. See generally
Mykkeltvedt, To Supplant the Fifth Amendment's Right Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination: The Supreme
Court and Federal Grants of Witness Immunity, 30 MERCER L. REv. 633 (1979).
128. In United States v. Gaither, 539 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (statement of Bazelon, C.J.,
explaining denial of rehearing en banc), Judge Bazelon questioned the vitality of Earl in light of the
availability of use immunity:
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requiring the prosecution to request immunity on behalf of the
defense no longer bars a subsequent prosecution of the immunized
witness. Thus, the separation of powers problem no longer focuses
on the pretrial decision to prosecute, a determination which enjoys
virtually unfettered protection from judicial interference. Instead,
the separation of powers analysis centers on the conduct of the
trial itself, a context in which the discretion of the prosecution is not
absolute. 2 9 Although a judicial grant of use immunity could affect
a subsequent decision to prosecute the immunized witness, because
Kastiger requires the Government to bear a "heavy burden" to
establish that the evidence used in the subsequent prosecution was
not derived from the witness's immunized testimony, 130 such a
grant of immunity would not altogether bar future prosecution of
that witness. 131
Nixon clearly indicates that in the context of a criminal trial
both the executive and judiciary must play a role in protecting the
public interest - to see that justice is done.132 Therefore, because
the availability of use and derivative use immunity makes it
possible to grant defense witness immunity without unduly
This court has decided that the Government cannot be compelled to grant
transactional immunity to a defense witness. Earl v. United States, 124 U.S. App. D.C.
77, 361 F.2d 531 (1966). The costs to the Government when it grants transactional
immunity, however, are much greater than when it grants use immunity. Thus I do
not believe Earl is dispositive of the use immunity issue.
Id. at 754 n.1.
But see United States v. Lenz, 616 F.2d 960, 962-63 (6th Cir. 1980) (rejecting argument that
Kastzgar's approval of use immunity affects the issue, because courts have no inherent power to grant
immunity).
129. Unites States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971
(1976).
130. 406 U.S. at 461-62. In Kastigar, the Court held that once a defendant demonstrated that he
had testified under a grant of immunity to matters related to his prosecution the Government has the
burden of establishing that its evidence against him is not tainted by showing that all of the evidence
it intends to use is derived from legitimate independent sources. Id. at 460-62. The Court
characterized the Government's burden as a "heavy" one. Id. at 461. See infra Notes 209-22 and
accompanying text.
131. See 406 U.S. at 460-62. Some jurisdictions still employ a form of transactional immunity.
For example, the North Dakota and California immunity statutes confer full transactional
immunity. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 31-01-09 (1976); CAL. PENAL CODE S 1324 (West Supp. 1980).
The fact that statutory immunity is transactional, however, does not prevent the court from
fashioning a form of judicial use immunity. In Daly v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 132, 560 P.2d
1193, 137 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1977), the California Supreme Court held, in a civil discovery setting, that
the trial court had the power to grant use and derivative use immunity to compel the defendants to
respond to questions in depositions. Id. at 146-47, 560 P.2d at 1202-03, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.
132. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the Supreme Court recognized that the
ends ofjustice would be defeated if the executive'branch were allowed to prevent a full exposition of
the facts needed by either the prosecution or defense. Id. at 709. While Nixon did not present a
conflict in positive form between the judiciary and the executive qua prosecutor, it did implicate the
separation of powers doctrine in a conflict between the courts and the President as a third party to a
criminal prosecution. Id. at 703-13. Thus, while Nixon is not express authority for the proposition
that prosecutorial discretion may be tempered in the trial context by the needs of the defense and the
interest of the judiciary in seeing that justice is done, it nevertheless contains very sweeping language
suggesting that executive prerogative may not be used to thwart the goals of criminal justice, i.e.,
"that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." Id. at 709 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
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infringing upon prosecutorial prerogative in the charging decision,
the doctrine of separation of powers no longer poses an
insurmountable barrier to judicial intervention in granting or
ordering immunity. Moreover, the separation of powers analysis is
no longer focused upon the pretrial stage, where the prosecution
enjoys virtually unfettered discretion, but upon the trial itself,
where judicial concerns for the integrity of the criminal justice
system weigh more heavily and where the court may exercise its
inherent supervisory power. 133
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR DEFENSE WITNESS
IMMUNITY
Thus far, this Note has emphasized the competing interests
and powers of the executive and the judiciary in the context of
witness immunity. Attention is now turned to the conflict between
the prosecution and the rights of the defendant, particularly his
right to defense witness immunity.
Courts have characterized the right to defense witness
immunity as stemming from the constitutional right to present a
defense, 134 the defendant's constitutional right to obtain favorable
evidence, 135 and the right to present an effective defense. 136 In
United States v. Nixon, 137 the Court alluded to the due process
1 38
133. One can make a plausible argument that the power to order or grant defense witness
immunity is derived from the inherent supervisory power of the federal courts over the conduct of
criminal trials. In holding inadmissible statements taken during a delay in presenting the accused
before a magistrate, the United States Supreme Court characterized the supervisory power of the
federal courts as follows:
Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts
implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and
evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance of those minimal
historic safeguards for securing trial by reason which are summarized as "due process
of law" and below which we reach what is really trial by force.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
The supervisory power serves the two-fold purpose of protecting judicial integrity and deterring
illegality. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-36 n.8 (1980). Although this power has been
employed primarily to exclude evidence, see, eg., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 204, 223 (1960);
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and occasionally to prevent prosecution, see United
States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276 (2d'Cir. 1974) (outrageous conduct by government officials
in kidnapping defendant in foreign country shocked the conscience of the court), there is no apparent
reason why the federal courts could not exercise their supervisory powers to facilitate the admission
of evidence. Indeed, while recent decisions of the Supreme Court suggest that the supervisory power
should not be used to impede the truth-finding process, see, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.
727, 735 (1980), nowhere does the Court suggest that the power not be exercised in favor of the
accused to enhance this same process. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231 (1975).
134. See Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal
Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711,824-30 (1976).
135. Note, "The Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence": The Defendant's Constitutional Right to
Witness Immunity, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1213 (1978).
136. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 970 (3d Cir. 1980).
137. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
138. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974).
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guarantee and the sixth amendment right to compulsory process' 13 9
as potential sources for the right to evidence withheld under the
doctrine of executive privilege. In the ordinary case it is not
executive privilege, but rather the privilege against self-
incrimination, which serves to bar defense access to favorable
evidence. This section of this Note will explore the constitutional
underpinnings of the right to defense witness immunity. The due
process and compulsory process clauses are the constitutional
guarantees most frequently cited as the basis for the right.1 40 In
certain contexts the confrontation clause may also support a right to
defense witness immunity. 
1 4'
A. COMPULSORY PROCESS AS A SOURCE FOR THE RIGHT TO
DEFENSE WITNESS IMMUNITY
In Earl v. United States, 142 the court's refusal to grant immunity
to a witness for the defense was challenged only on due process
grounds. 143 Subsequently, in Washington v. Texas, 44 the Supreme
Court breathed new life into the compulsory process clause' 45 by
incorporating it into the fourteenth amendment due process
provision and giving it an expanded interpretation.' 46 In striking
139. Id. at 709, 711.
140. See generally supra note 4 and sources cited therein.
141. United States v. Yates, 524 F.2d 1282, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In Yates, the court held that
a police officer's testimony rebutting the defendant's alibi, by referring to statements of an
acquaintance of the defendant who refused to testify, violated the defendant's sixth amendment
confrontation rights. Id. The court suggested that a grant of use immunity to the defendant's
acquaintance, thereby allowing cross-examination, would have rectified the problem. Id.
It should also be noted that in a situation in which a witness testifies against the defendant on
direct examination but refuses to testify on cross-examination by asserting his fifth amendment
privilege, all or part of that witness's direct testimony is subject to a motion to strike. United States v.
Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 222 (8th Cir. 1976); Fountain v. United States, 384 F.2d 624, 628 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1005 (1968); United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963).
The confrontation clause is generally viewed as the converse of the compulsory process clause,
and as such is not viewed as conferring a general right to present evidence in one's favor. Rather, it
gives the accused the right to confront the witness "against" him. See generally Westen, Confrontation
and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567 (1978).
Some state courts have, however, used the confrontation clause to override testimonial privileges.
See, e.g., Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1976) (marital communication privilege); State v.
Hembd, 305 Minn. 120, 232 N.W.2d 872 (1975) (physician-patient privilege). Cf Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1974) (confrontation right to reveal bias of state's witness is paramount to
state interest in maintaining confidentiality ofjuvenile records).
142. 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
143. Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
144. 388 U.S. 14(1967).
145. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... " Id. From 1807, when the
clause was given a liberal reading by Chief Justice Marshall sitting as a circuit judge in the trial of
Aaron Burr, United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 33-34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 692d), until the
Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Texas, the compulsory process clause lay virtually
dormant as a means of guaranteeing the rights of the criminally acused. See Westen, Compulsory
Process II, 74 MICH. L. REv. 192, 193-95 (1975); Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L.
REv. 71 (1974).
146. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-23 (1968).
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down two Texas statutes which precluded the defendant from
calling a coparticipant as a witness in his favor, 147 the Court held
that the compulsory process clause required more than merely
extending the state subpoena power to the defense.1 48 The Court
held that, in addition to making available the means of compelling
the attendance of witnesses, the compulsory process guarantee
gives the defense the right to use the testimony of witnesses in its
favor.' 49 The Court concluded that the right was, in essence, "the
right to present a defense.' 150 The Court specifically left open the
question whether or to what extent the compulsory process clause
could prevail over a claim of testimonial privilege. 151
Because Earl predated Washington v. Texas, it has been argued
that the issue of defense witness immunity should be reevaluated
52
in light of the expanded definition of compulsory process.
Subsequent lower court decisions, however, have refused to
recognize the right to defense witness immunity as springing from
the compulsory process clause.1 53 Such courts rely upon the
assumption that whenever a conflict arises between the defendant's
sixth amendment right to compulsory process and the witness's
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the fifth
amendment privilege must prevail. 1
54
147. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 82 (Vernon 1952); TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 711
(Vernon 1925). The Texas statutes at issue prevented the coparticipant in Washington, who had been
convicted and would have offered testimony exonerating the defendant, from testifying for the
defendant, but not the state. 388 U.S. at 16-17.
148. 388 U.S. at 23.
149. Id. "The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a
defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testsimony he had no right to use.
Id.
150. Id. at 19. The Court stated:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if
necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the
defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide
where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's
witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his
own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due
process of law.
Id.
151. Id. at 23 n.21. The Court noted:
Nothing in this opinion should be construed as disapproving testimonial privileges,
such as the privilege against self-incrimination or the lawyer-client or husband-wife
privileges, which are based on entirely different considerations from those underlying
the common-law disqualifications for interest. Nor do we deal in this case with
nonarbitrary state rules that disqualify as witnesses persons who, because of mental
infirmity or infancy, are incapable of observing events or testifying about them.
Id.
152. See Clinton, supra note 134, at 825.
153. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856
(1981); United States v. Lenz, 616 F.2d 960, 962 (6th Cir. 1980).
154. See United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
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Although several commentators have argued that the right to
defense witness immunity stems from the sixth amendment
compulsory process clause, 155 courts which have discussed the issue
appear uniformly to reject the argument. 156 Even those decisions
which have recognized the right apparently have rejected the
contention that it derives from the compulsory process clause. 157
Yet, in United States v. Nixon, 158 the Supreme Court suggested that
the compulsory process clause, 15 9 as well as the due process
clause, 160  required the production of evidence over a claim of
constitutional privilege. 16' Thus, a defense witness's claim of
1005 (1978) ("The Sixth Amendment right of an accused to compulsory process to secure the
attendance of a witness does not include the right to compel the witness to waive his Fifth
Amendment privilege."); United States v. LaCouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir. 1974)
(defendant's rights under the compulsory process clause could not override witness's privilege
against compelled self-incrimination) United States ex rel. Tatman v. Anderson,
391 F. Supp. 68, 71 (D. Del. 1975) ("when a witness's Fifth Amendment right against compulory
self-incrimination comes in conflict with a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory
process, the witness's Fifth Amendment right dominates, forcing the defendant to go to trial on less
than all the possible evidence"); Holloway v. Wolff, 351 F. Supp. 1033, 1038 (D. Neb. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds, 482 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1973) ("When the Sixth Amendment and Fifth Amendment
guarantees collide.., the Sixth Amendment right must yield.").
Perhaps the most egregious example of an application of the rule that the fifth amendment
right of the witness is paramount to the compulsory process right of the accused is found in Walden
v. State. 284 So. 2d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The defendant had been convicted of robbery
and assault with intent to commit murder, and had been sentenced to a thirty-five year prison term.
Id. at 440. While in prison, the defendant met another convict who admitted that he had committed
the crimes for which the defendant had been convicted. Id. The convict gave an affidavit to that effect
and agreed to testify for the defendant. Defendant moved for a new trial, but at an evidentiary
hearing on his motion the man who admitted committing the crimes invoked his fifth amendment
right. Id. at 440-41. The court refused to grant defendant's motion for new trial, citing the footnote
in Washington v. Texas. and Holloway, v. Wolfftbr the proposition that the accused's sixth amendment
right must yield in such a situation. Id. at 441.
155. See, e.g., Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. Rev. 71, 166-70 (1974); Note,
The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1266
(1978).
156. United States v. Lenz. 616 F.2d 960, 962 (6th Cir. 1980): United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d
505, 512-13 (7th Cir.). cert. dented, 393 U.S. 846 (1968).
157. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 970-71 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing
right to jidicial immunity as stemming from due process clause): United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d
1191. 1199-1200 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979) (rejecting argument that right to
immunity derives from sixth amendment).
158. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
159. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683. 709 (1974) ("To ensure that justice is done, it is
imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of
evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense ').
160. Id at 711.
161. Id. at 705-06. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the President asserted a
claim of executive privilege as a bar to a subpoena duces tecurn directing him to turn over certain
documents and tape recordings to the Watergate Special Prosecutor. Id. at 686. The Court
recognized that executive privilege was a constitutionally based privilege, id. at 708-11, but held that
a generalized claim of executive privilege must yield to the specific need for evidence in a pending
criminal trial. Id. at 713. While Nixon is easily distinguishable as a case suigeneris, or as a case in
which the evidence was sought over a claim of privilege not by the defense but by the prosecutor, the
language of the Court speaks in general terms of constitutionally based privilege and the production
of evidence "needed either by the prosecution or by the defense." Id. at 709.
The Court also discussed the fifth amendment privilege and other testimonial privileges. Id.
While it is fairly arguable that such privileges might receive a different treatment than the
generalized assertion of executive privilege at issue in Nixon, the Court's remarks concerning the
scope of these privileges in a criminal case are quite universal: "Whatever their origins, these
exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed,
for they are in derogation of the search for truth." Id. at 710 (footnote omitted). Thus, although
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privilege arguably presents a classic confrontation between two
constitutional guarantees. The Supreme Court has long recognized
that in such situations the fifth amendment should not unilaterally
prevail, but that a proper accomodation may be possible:
When two principles come in conflict with each other, the
court must give them both a reasonable construction, so
as to preserve them both to a reasonable extent. The
principle which entitles the United States to the testimony
of every citizen, and the principle by which every witness
is privileged not to accuse h'imself, can neither of them be
entirely disregarded. They are believed both to be
preserved to a reasonable extent .... 162
The means of making an accommodation between fifth and sixth
amendment rights, which reasonably preserves both, is a grant of
immunity. The Court has previously recognized that it has the
inherent power to remedy constitutional violations 163 and has
specifically recognized that it has the power to grant use immunity
to obviate conflicts between constitutional guarantees. 1
64
While recent lower court decisions suggest that the compulsory
process clause may not serve as the basis for a right to defense
witness immunity, 165 the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Nixon lends support to a contrary conclusion. Even if the
compulsory process clause alone would not provide the
constitutional basis for the right to defense witness immunity, it
may nevertheless provide ancillary support for recognition of the
right through the due process clause. 1
66
Nixon dealt with executive privilege rather than the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, both are constitutionally based, and according to the Court must be narrowly
construed.
162. Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 364 (1917) (quoting In re Willie, 25 F. Cas. 38, 38-
39 (C.C. D.Va. 1807) (No. 14,692e) (Marshall, Circuit.Justice, 1807)).
163. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971) (federal
courts possess equitable power to remedy constitutional violations of the equal protection clause in
the form of segregation in the public schools). See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The
Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972).
164. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (Court found it intolerable that fifth
amendment right would have to be surrendered to assert fourth amendment standing, and thus
created a form of use immunity for defendant's suppression hearing testimony).
165. See supra note 153.
166. The Nixon Court suggested that the compulsory process right and the due process clause
together might create a right to favorable evidence when it stated:
The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has
constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every
defendant in a criminal trial the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against
him" and "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of
liberty without due process of law. It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate
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B. DUE PROCESS AS A SOURCE OF THE RIGHT TO DEFENSE
WITNESS IMMUNITY
The due process clause is the constitutional guarantee relied
on by courts that have recognized a right to defense witness
immunity, 167 and is regarded by those courts which have thus far
refused to find such a right as the constitutional provision from
which such a right would likely emanate if it were to be
recognized. 168 Moreover, the evolution of decisions of the Supreme
Court suggests that if the right were to be fully recognized by that
Court, it would be based on the general due process clause, rather
than the more specific compulsory process clause. 169 Therefore, a
discussion of the appropriate rationale for recognition of the due
those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and admissible
evidence be produced.
418 U.S. at 711. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (196'5) (plurality opinion)
(constitutional right to privacy emanates from penumbras of several specific guarantees).
167. I. United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976), the court held that the
compulsory process and due process clauses were violated when the prosecutor drove a defense
witness from the stand by threats of future prosecution, and thus required that the prosecution
request immunity for that witness or suffer an acquittal of the defendant. Id. at 226-29. The Third
Circuit subsequently interpreted Morrison as not basing the right of defense witness immunity on the
compulsory process clause. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1199-1200 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied,, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). In Herman, the court read Morrision as not recognizing the right to
defense witness immunity based upon the compulsory process clause, but rather recognizing
statutory immunity as a cure for government misconduct. Id. at 1200. The Herman court did,
however, acknowledge that the possibility for judicially fashioned use immunity for defense witnesses
did exist, but that a right to such immunity sprang from the due process clause, not the compulsory
process clause.
Finally, in Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 968-72 (3d Cir. 1980), the
Third Circuit recognized that the defense right to both statutory and judicially granted use immunity
for its witnesses was based on the due process clause.
168. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 773-74, 777 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 856 (1981); United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 193 (1st Cir. 1980); United
States v. Lenz, 616 F.2d 960, 962-63 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Allessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1082
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 n.l (D.C. Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
169. While the Warren Court was more likely to find constitutional violations under the specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights, perhaps because of its selective-incorporation approach to the
fourteenth amendment due process clause, cf. Israel, Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court and the Legacy
of the Warren Court, 75 MicH. L. REV. 1319, 1326-30 (1977) (discussing Warren Court's selective
incorporation of specific constitutional protections), the Burger Court seems to prefer to base its
decisions on the more general protection of the due process clause. See, e.g., Ham v. South Carolina,
409 U.S. 524 (1973) (defect in voir dire found to violate "essential demands of fairness" of due
process, rather than right to jury trial).
One commentator has urged that decisions, where possible, should be grounded on specific
constitutional guarantees rather than the general protection of the due process clause because of the
greater protections afforded under the specific guarantees. See Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause,
73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 130-31 (1974). See also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). The
Donnelly Court stated:
When specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights are involved, this Court has taken
special care to assure that prosecutorial conduct in no way impermissibly infringes
them. But here the claim is only that a prosecutor's remark about respondent's
expectations at trial by itself so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the
resulting conviction a denial of due process. We do not believe that examination of the
entire proceedings in this case supports that contention.
Id at 643
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process right to defense witness immunity is necessary. Two
separate but supporting justifications emerge from case law
buttressing a right to defense witness immunity under the due
process clause: First, the due process clause supports the
defendant's right to exculpatory evidence; second, the due process
clause supports a defense right to a fair balance of procedures in the
search for truth.
1. Due Process Right to Exculpatory Evidence
The due process right to defense witness immunity, based on
the need for exculpatory evidence, proceeds from a line of United
States Supreme Court cases beginning with Roviaro v. United
States,170 and culminating in Chambers v. Mississippi. 171 In Roviaro,
the Supreme Court held that an assertion of the informer's
privilege must yield "[wihere the disclosure of an informer's
identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and
helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair
determination of a cause. "172 In McCray-v. Illinois, 173 the Court
found that the same privilege need not give way in the context of a
suppression hearing where the issue contested was probable cause
to justify a search and seizure. 174 The Court did, however, reaffirm
the validity of its holding in Roviaro, which involved "the trial itself
where the issue was the fundamental one of innocence or guilt." 1
75
The ability to hang the right to defense witness immunity on a single constitutional peg
could admittedly provide greater protection and avoid the case by case jurisprudence of the due
process approach of fundamental fairness. Courts which have considered the issue, though, have
universally rejected the notion that the compulsory process clause is the source of the right. The mere
fact that the right to defense witness immunity stems from the general protection of the due process
clause, however, does not necessarily mean that a court may not lay down specific guidelines and
standards for the application of the right. In Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964
(3d Cir. 1980), this is precisely what the court did. Id. at 972. Moreover, the Supreme Court in
related contexts has set down similar standards for judging the application of rights emanating from
the due process clause. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-12 (1976) (establishing
standard of materiality for prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory matter to the defense).
170. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
171. 410 U.S. 284(1973).
172. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957). In Roviaro, the defendant appealed
his conviction for sale and illegal transportation of narcotics. Id. at 58-59. He contended that the trial
court committed reversible error when it allowed the Government to refuse to disclose the identity of
an informer who participated in the sale and was therefore a material witness to the defendant's
connection with the narcotics. Id. at 55. The Government's refusal to disclose the identity of the
informant was based on the informer's privilege. Id. at 59. The Supreme Court found that this
privilege was limited, and that disclosure may be required where relevant and helpful to the defense
of the accused. Id. at 60-61. A determination whether disclosure was required involved a balancing
of the needs of the public in protecting the flow of information to the police and the individual's right
to prepare his defense. Id. at 62. In evaluating the defendant's right, the Court considered the
materiality of the informer's potential testimony in light of the charges and the other evidence. Id.
Because the unidentified informer was the only witness to counteract the testimony of the police
officer, who had secreted himself in the trunk of the car in which the defendant and the informer were
riding, the Court held that prejudicial error had been committed. Id. at 64-65.
173. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
174. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309 (1967).
175. Id.
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Thus, Roviaro broadly supports a defendant's right to information
helpful to the preparation of his defense or essential to a
determination of his innocence or guilt, despite the interjection of a
privilege or the Government's refusal to make the needed
information available.
In Brady v. Maryland,'7 6 the Supreme Court held "that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process when the evidence is material
either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution."' 77  Thus, Brady, by forbidding
prosecutorial suppression of favorable evidence, broadly mandates
prosecutorial disclosure of all exculpatory evidence. In United States
v. Agurs,'78 the Brady holding was extended to exculpatory evidence
not requested at all, or requested in only general terms. 17 9 The
Court in Brady noted: "Society wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated
unfairly. "180
A due process challenge based on Brady was raised in Earl v.
United States,' 8' but was rejected on the ground that prosecutorial
refusal to request defense witness immunity did not involve the
affirmative suppression of evidence. 182 Agurs, however, suggests
176. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), petitioner and a
companion were found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. Brady and his companion were tried
separately, with Brady being tried first. Id. at 84. There was no apparent question as to Brady's
participation in the crime; however, Brady testified that his companion had done the actual killing.
Id. Prior to trial, the defense had specifically requested disclosure of any statements made by Brady's
companion. Several statements were shown to defense counsel, but one statement of the companion,
in which he admitted the actual homicide, was withheld until after Brady had been tried, convicted,
and sentenced. Id. Although acquiescing in the conclusion of the Maryland court that withholding
this evidence would not have affected the outcome of the trial with respect to the issue of guilt, the
Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that a new trial on the issue of punishment was required. Id.
at 87-91.
177. Id. at 87.
178. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). In Agurs, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the standard of
materiality that was required to entitle the defense to evidence in the prosecution's possession.
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). The evidence at issue in Agurs consisted of the
murder victim's two prior convictions for assault and carrying a deadly weapon. Id. at 100-01. The
Agurs Court set out the various standards of materiality depending upon prosecutorial use of perjured
testimony, suppression of obviously exculpatory evidence specifically requested, and voluntary
disclosure of exculpatory evidence unrequested or only generally requested. Id. at 103-12. See Note,
"The Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence": The Defendant's Constitutional Right to Witness
Immunity, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1211, 1235-36 n. 111 (1978).
The Court in Agurs held that evidence which is not obviously material or exculpatory need be
turned over to the defense only if the omitted evidence would create a reasonable doubt that does not
otherwise exist. 427 U.S. at 112. The Court, however, read Brady as requiring the disclosure of
evidence which is obviously of substantial value to the defense, even without a specific request. Id. at
110.
179. Id. at 102.
180. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
181. 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
182. Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967)
("Here the prosecution has not affirmatively withheld a witness or concealed evidence. ").
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that affirmative action by the prosecutor to make evidence or
testimony unavailable is not the sine qua non for the assessment of a
due process violation.1 83 Indeed, the distinction seems artificial
when viewed in the light of the prosecution's affirmative duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence. Moreover, the fact that the
unavailability of the exculpatory evidence is occasioned by a
witness's invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination,
rather than prosecutorial obstinance, is immaterial because the
prosecuting attorney has the power to compel the testimony by
requesting immunity.
In Chambers v. Mississippi,184  the Court held that the
combination of the state's hearsay and voucher rules violated due
process in that they prevented the defense from cross-examining its
own witness and precluded testimony of other individuals who
would have testified that the witness had confessed to the crime for
which the defendant was charged.1 85 Although the Court alluded to
the confrontation and compulsory process clauses,1 8 6 it ultimately
based its decision on due process grounds,I8 7 holding, in effect, that
the mechanistic application of state rules of evidence to exclude
exculpatory evidence could not be allowed to defeat the ends of
justice. 188
Chambers, at the very least, stands for the proposition that due
process will not permit arbitrary rules of procedure to prevent the
introduction of exculpatory evidence by the defense. Broadly
stated, Chambers suggests that due process guarantees the defense a
constitutional right to present exculpatory evidence. It was
precisely this latter reading that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit employed as the basis for recognizing the due
process right to defense witness immunity. 189 In Government of Virgin
Islands v. Smith, the court concluded that the prosecutorial refusal to
request immunity for the juvenile witness whose testimony would
have been exculpatory was not different in substance from the
violation found in Chambers. ' 90
Roviaro, Brady, and Chambers establish the defendant's right to
183. 427 U.S. at 107.
184. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
185. Chambers v, Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 289-94, 302-03 (1973).
186. Id. at 301-02.
187. Id. at 302 ("We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evidence, coupled with the
State's refusal to permit Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a trial in accord with
traditional and fundamental standards of due process.").
188. Id. at 297-98, 302.
189. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 970 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Chambers v.
Mississippi_ .. , albeit in a context different than immunity, furnishes strong support for the holding
that immunity may be required for a defense witness if realistic meaning is to be given to a
defendant's due process right to have exculpatory evidence presented to thejury.").
190. Id. at 970.
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exculpatory evidence. A broad reading of these cases further
establishes that, to be meaningful, the due process right to
exculpatory evidence includes access to such evidence over a claim
of privilege' 91 and the right to effectively present such evidence at
trial.
2. Due Process Requirement of a Fair Balance of Procedures in
Search for the Truth
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court clearly evidence
an understanding that although a criminal trial is an adversary
proceeding it is, above all else, a search for the truth. 19 Thus, rules
which interfere with the truth-finding function are disfavored, and
testimonial privileges will be narrowly construed to avoid the loss of
valuable evidence. 193  Although the Constitution itself places
obstacles in the path of the search for truth by providing the
accused with certain safeguards' 94 and by casting the role of the
defense as that of a true adversary, the Supreme Court has
indicated that the adversary role of the prosecutor is limited by an
overriding obligation to establish the truth:
The United States Attorney is the representative not
of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win
a case but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. 195
191. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-61 (1957) (government informer's privilege).
192. In upholding the notice-of-alibi rule at issue in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970),
the Court acknowledged that the purpose of a criminal trial is a search for the truth:
The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself: it is not yet a poker game in
which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played. We
find ample room in that system, at least as far as "due process" is concerned, for the
instant Florida rule, which is designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal
trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate
certain facts crucial to the determination ofguilt or innocence.
Id. (footnote omitted).
193. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974).
194. The sixth amendment contains the primary trial safeguards guaranteed to the criminally
accused. Other protections are afforded by the fourth and fifth amendments and the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
195. Berger v. United States. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). The Code of Professional Responsibility
also imposes constraints on the prosecutor. It subjects him to discipline if he institutes a prosecution
when he knows or it is obvious that he lacks probable cause, or if he fails to disclose all exculpatory
evidence. See ABA CoDE oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIctTv DR 7-103 (1980).
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In the context of pretrial discovery, the Court has recognized
that the adversary nature of the trial must be tempered by due
process concerns for balanced procedures designed to enhance the
search for the truth. For example, in Wardius v. Oregon, 196 the Court
held unconstitutional a notice-of-alibi rule which imposed a duty on
the defense to disclose alibi witnesses without requiring a reciprocal
obligation on the prosecution. The Court stated "that in the
absence of a strong showing of state interests to the contrary,
discovery must be a two-way street. "197
The language of the Wardius Court is most instructive in
assessing the due process ramifications of that decision regarding
the right to defense witness immunity: "The State may not insist
that trials be run as a 'search for truth' so far as defense witnesses
are concerned, while maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own
witnesses." 19 Although a witness with potentially exculpatory
evidence who invokes the fifth amendment is not technically a
witness for the government, the due process clause, as construed in
Wardius, demands, under certain circumstances, that the
Government's power to make such testimony available be
employed on behalf of the defense. If the Government refuses to
make the testimony available by requesting immunity, the court
has the power to dismiss the action' 99 or, according to recent
decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, grant judicial immunity. 20 0
Although the due process clause clearly does not require that
precisely the same procedures be made available to the defense as
are vested in the government, 20 1 under certain circumstances the
Constitution requires that witness immunity be made available to
the defense. To hold otherwise would not only deprive the
defendant of his right to present potentially exculpatory
evidence, 20 2 but would be in derogation of the model of the
criminal trial as a search for the truth. In addition, it would
196. 412 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1973).
197. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 (1973).
198. Id.
199. See United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 1976). Cf Roviaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53, 61 (1957) ("in these situations the trial court may require disclosure and, if the
Government withholds the information, dismiss the action").
200. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 970-71 (3d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1203-04 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
201. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972) (Constitution does not require police to
make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case).
But see Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966), in which the Court stated with regard to
defense access to grand jury minutes: "In our adversary system for determining guilt or innocence, it
is rarely justifiable for the prosecution to have exclusive access to a storehouse of relevant fact.
Exceptions to this are justifiable only by the clearest and most compelling considerations. " Id. at 873
(tootnote omitted).
202. See supra notes 170-91 and accompanying text.
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constitute an implicit rejection of the prosecutor's role as a
representative of the sovereign whose duty, above all else, is to see
that justice is done.
V. PROBLEMS WITH DEFENSE WITNESS IMMUNITY
Theoretically, a grant of defense witness use immunity,
because it is coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, poses no problems for the witness. 20 3 Defense
witness immunity may, however, create problems for the
Government should it later decide to prosecute the witness. There
are two primary arguments 204 raised against defense witness
immunity: (1) It will effectively prevent subsequent prosecution
because of the heavy burden imposed by Kastigar to prove that the
evidence used in the subsequent prosecution was not derived from
203. Kastigarv. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). Although a grant of use immunity is
theoretically coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege, a grant of use immunity may have
collateral consequence for the witness. For example, a grant of immunity will not be effective in civil
proceedings. See Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1118 (7th Cir. 1975). In addition,
immunized testimony may be used in administrative proceedings. In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 476-77
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Segretti v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 878, 886-87, 544 P.2d
929, 932-33, 126 Cal. Rptr. 793, 796-97 (1976) (holding federal use immunity order ineffective to
shield witness from use of tesitmony in state bar disciplinary proceedings). Thus, a witness may have
more at stake than the possibility of self-incrimination.
An additional problem for the defendant arises if the immunized witness still refuses to testify.
In such situations the defendant most likely will have to be tried without the testimony, even if a due
process right to defense witness immunity has been established, unless he can show that
governmental misconduct produced the loss of testimony. See Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense:
An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711, 830 (1976). The only
remedy the defense has in such a situation is a contempt order against the witness. See Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Furthermore, a witness granted immunity under a state statute providing transactional
immunity will not enjoy full immunity if a separate sovereign, such as another state or the federal
government, seeks to prosecute that individual on related matters. See Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). In United States v. First
Western State Bank of Minot, 491 F.2d 780 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974), the court
held that a state statute automatically granting transactional immunity to witnesses did not bar a
subsequent federal prosecution where the government had established, consistent with the
requirements of Kastigar and Murphy, that the evidence used against the defendants was derived from
independent sources. Id. at 782, 787.
204. Other arguments recently raised include: (1) a grant of defense witness immunity may
curtail prosecutorial cross-examination of the witness for fear that in a subsequent prosecution the
witness may claim that the evidence used was tainted by use of his immunized testimony; and (2) a
requirement of defense witness immunity may interfere with joint trials of co-defendants. See United
States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856 (1981). It is
beyond the scope of this Note to provide a comprehensive treatment of these two recently raised
issues.
The simple answer to the argument that the scope of prosecutorial cross-examination may be
narrowed is that the prosecution enjoys no constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses.
Moreover, if it did suspect that cross-examination might involve matters concerning offenses for
which it would later prosecute the witness, it could seek to complete its investigation on those matters
in order to sterilize its evidence against charges that it was tainted by the immunized testimony.
The question of severance ofjoint trials is more problematic. There is a body of authority which
suggests that severance is required where one of the co-defendants possesses exculpatory evidence
which he would be willing to divulge if he were tried separately. E.g., United States v. Martinez, 486
F.2d 15, 22-23 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 776 (4th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 897 (7th Cir. 1965). See generally United States v. Stout, 499 F. Supp.
605 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (addressing defendant's motion for severance and immunity for co-defendant).
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the witness's prior immunized testimony; 20 5 and (2) a grant of
defense witness immunity will allow the witness to give his
confederates an "immunity bath.' '206
A. SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION OF THE IMMUNIZED WITNESS
A grant of defense witness immunity, whether it be statutory
or judicially fashioned use immunity, does not bar a subsequent
prosecution of that witness. 20 7 However, as the Court stated in
Kastigar, "One raising a claim under this statute need only show
that he testified under a grant of immunity in order to shift to the
Government the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it
proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent
sources. "208
1. Kastigar's Heavy Burden
The Court made it clear in Kastigar that the prosecution's
burden of proof "was not limited to a negation of taint," but
imposed an "affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes
to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the
compelled testimony." 20 9 The Court, however, did not specify the
burden of proof required to satisfy the affirmative duty. One court
has held, by analogy to confession law standards, that the
prosecution need only establish by a preponderance of the
evidence 210 that the evidence sought to be used was derived from
independent sources. At least one other court, however, has
assumed that the prosecution must establish the independent
nature of the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
21
1
Regardless of the precise standard applied, it is clear that the
burden, while not insurmountable, is substantial. 2 12 Because the
205. In Turkish, the court argued that, in order to staisfy the heavy burden imposed by Kastigar
requiring proof that its evidence was obtained from sources wholly independent of the witness's
immunized testimony, the Government may be forced to forego contact with the witness and arrange
for a new team of prosecutors and investigators to pursue the case against him. 623 F.2d at 775.
206. Id.; In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1973).
207. SeeGovernment of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 973 (3d Cir. 1980).
208. 406 U.S. at 461-62.
209. Id. at 460.
210. United States v. Seiffert, 357 F. Supp. 801, 805-06 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d 974,
982 (5th Cir. 1974).
211. United States v. Henderson, 406 F. Supp. 417, 423 (D. Del. 1975).
212. See United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 312 (8th Cir. 1973). The court in McDaniel
held that, on the facts of that case, the Government's burden of proof was virtually undischargeable.
Id. The prosecutor had obtained and read a three-volume transcript of the defendant's immunized
state grand jury testimony. Id. at 311. Despite the Government's offer of proof that all of the
evidence used in the prosecution had been obtained prior to the perusal of the immunized testimony
by the United States Attorney, id. at 309, the court held that the immunized testimony could not be
used for any purpose, including the decision to prosecute. Id. at 311. The court stated that because
219
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fifth amendment requires that a grant of immunity afforded by one
sovereign be recognized by other sovereigns, at least to the extent
of use and derivative use, a grant of witness immunity by a federal
prosecutor may affect state prosecution of related matters, and vice-
versa. 213 Where the same sovereign both grants immunity and
subsequently prosecutes, it may be very difficult to establish that
the evidence used to prosecute was derived from an independent
source. 21 4 Prosecution, however, is not impossible. For example,
evidence that has been obtained prior to the immunity grant is
undisputably derived from an independent source .21
5
There has been some question whether Kastigar precludes even
non-evidentiary use of the immunized testimony. The language of
Kastigar suggests that it does, 21 6 and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has so held. 217 Thus, not only may
the immunized evidence not be used to develop investigatory
leads, 218 but according to the Eighth Circuit, it also may not be
used to decide to initiate prosecution or otherwise plan trial
strategy. 219
Although Kastigar's approval of use immunity enhances the
prospect for a right to defense witness immunity, 22 0  the heavy
burden it imposes on the prosecution to prove the independent
nature of evidence used in a subsequent prosecution of the witness
poses a problem for full recognition of the right to defense witness
immunity. Although the argument that a grant of defense witness
the immunized testimony could have had a subjective effect on the prosecutor, the Government
could not meet its burden. Id. at 312. But see United States v. First Western State Bank of Minot, 491
F.2d 780, 787 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1975) (Government met its burden by showing
that federal authorities had no knowledge of the compelled testimony and by introducing FBI reports
and federal grand jury transcripts compiled before immunzed testimony given).
213. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
214. United States v. First Western State Bank of Minot, 491 F.2d 780, 783 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1975). See also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 469 (1972) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
Perhaps the reason that subsequent prosecution of immunized witnesses is thought to be so
difficult is that rarely are such prosecutions attempted. It seems logical that for the same reasons that
prosecutors are unlikely to seek harsh penalties for those who cooperate, so too are they unlikely to
prosecute witnesses who have been immunized to aid in the conviction of others. Cf United States v.
Kuehn, 562 F.2d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 1977) (United States Attorney sought to enjoin state prosecution
of previously immunized federal witness).
215. In United States v. First Western State Bank of Minot, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit noted that FBI reports made prior to the date of the immunized testimony and federal
grand jury sessions held prior to the testimony "irrefragably should be considered as independent
sources." 491 F.2d at 783.
216. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). In Kastigar, the Court stated that the
use immunity statute "prohibit[ed] the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony
in any respect." Id. (emphasis by court).
217. In United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973), the court interpreted the Kastigar
prohibition against any use, direct or indirect, to include "focusing the investigation, deciding to
initiate prosecution, refusing to plea-bargain, interpreting evidence, planning cross-examination,
and otherwise generally planning trial strategy." Id. at 311.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
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immunity would prevent subsequent prosecution of that witness,
thus interfering with the prosecutorial prerogative, should no
longer be considered valid,2 2 1 a variation of that argument remains.
The argument now advanced is that, because the prosecution has
such a heavy burden to prove that evidence it uses in a subsequent
prosecution is derived from independent sources, the decision to
prosecute is impeded or is made so costly that rarely will an
immunized witness be prosecuted. 222 There are, however, ways to
alleviate the heavy burden imposed on the prosecution and thus
facilitate the prospect for defense witness immunity.
2. Sterilization of Prosecution Evidence
In many cases, a grant of defense witness use immunity will be
virtually costless to the Government. For example, if the
Government has already assembled all the evidence necessary to
prosecute the witness, the Government will be able to establish that
it has derived from independent sources all of the evidence it seeks
to use against the witness. 223 To facilitate the burden of establishing
that the evidence is free of taint, the Government may catalogue the
evidence or submit it to the court under seal. 224 Similarly, when the
sovereign granting immunity is different from the sovereign
prosecuting the witness, the compelled testimony may be isolated
from the prosecuting sovereign.
225
Problems arise, however, when the same sovereign grants
immunity and later attempts to prosecute the witness. 226 In such
cases, the court may grant a continuance to allow the prosecution to
assemble evidence against the witness prior to his testimony. 227 In
221. Id.
222. The irony of this situation is that the more the prosecution's burden is lightened, the easier
it will be to justify a right to defense witness immunity. Thus, in order to enhance the rights of the
defendant, the rights of the witness and future defendant must be limited.
223. See United States v. First Western State Bank of Minot, 491 F.2d 780, 783 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1975) (discussed in note 215 supra). See also Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to
Have Use Immunity Grantedto Defense Witnesses, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1266, 1276-77 (1978).
224. See Note, "The Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence": The Defendant's Constitutional
R~iht to Witness Immunity, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1240 (1978); cf Government of Virgin Islands v.
Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 973 (3d Cir. 1980) (Government may be able to "sterilize" the testimony of the
immunized witness and isolate it from future testimony).
225. See United States v. Bianco, 534 F.2d 501, 509-10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 822
(1976) (immunized grand jury testimony kept under lock and key by state district attorney, thus
indicating independent source of evidence in federal prosecution).
226. See supra note 214.
227. It seems likely that a continuance for a reasonable time to allow the prosecution to
gather evidence for future prosecution would not infringe upon the defendant's right to a speedy
trial, given the flexible analysis adopted by the Supreme Court in Barker s. Win1'o, 407 U.S. 514,
530 (1972). In Barker, the Court held that two of the factors used to determine a speedy trial violation
were the defendant's assertion of his right and prejudice to the defendant. Id. Cf Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 553 (1976) (continuance to allow publicity to abate may be necessary
to ensure fair trial).
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cases in which it is impractical for the prosecution to complete its
investigation before trial or when it has no, firm commitment to
prosecute the witness, the Government, in order to preserve a
future prosecution, may be required to isolate the immunized
testimony and any leads derived from it.228 Although these
procedures and others that may be devised will not be costless, our
system of criminal justice, of necessity, imposes certain costs on the
prosecution, and implicitly recognizes that it is better that a few
guilty people go free than that an innocent person suffer.
229
B. THE IMMUNITY BATH PROBLEM
The "immunity bath" argument contains two aspects. First,
it is feared that an immunized defense witness may attempt to
enlarge the scope of his own immunity by spontaneously testifying
to unrelated crimes, thereby setting up a challenge to a subsequent
prosecution on grounds of taint. Second, grants of defense witness
immunity may foster cooperative perjury. For example, a copar-
ticipant may secure immunity for himself, admit to the crime, and
exculpate his confederates with perjured testimony. The other par-
ticipants, having been acquitted, will be precluded from being tried
again by the double jeopardy provision; 2 30 the witness, even if
guilty of the substantive crime, can only be prosecuted for per-
jury,231 unless the Government can establish evidence of the sub-
stantive crime by independent sources. In this manner, defendants
can avoid conviction of the substantive offense by exposing them-
selves to perjury convictions, which often carry lighter penalties.
23 2
The first aspect of the immunity bath argument - spon-
taneous testimony about unrelated crimes - presents no real
problem. The immunity conferred applies only to responsive an-
swers. 233 Unsolicited spontaneous outbursts would not enjoy im-
munity. Thus, subsequent prosecution on such matters would not
subject the prosecution to Kastigar's heavy burden.
228. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 973 (3d Cir. 1980).
229. Cf Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("We
have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
Government should play an ignoble part. "). Indeed, the very idea ofwitness immunity assumes that
some guilty people must go free. Therefore, in a given situation, the prosecution may be forced to
choose which of two offenders to prosecute,
230. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; Green v. United States. 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (acquittal is a
bar to subsequent prosecution for same offense).
231. The immunity statute itself exempts perjury from its effect. 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (West
Supp. 1980). This provision was recently interpreted by the Supreme Court to permit, in a perjury
prosecution, the use of the truthful as well as untruthful testimony given under the grant of
immunity. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980).
232. United States v. Turkish. 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856
(1981).
233. Zicareili v. N.J. Investigation Comm'n. 406 U.S. 472, 477 (1972).
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The second aspect of the immunity bath argument is more
problematic. The simple answer is that the Government already
uses accomplices and coparticipants to obtain convictions. It is
equally probable that such individuals when acting as witnesses for
the Government will commit perjury to exculpate themselves and
inculpate the defendant, as it is probable that they will subject
themselves to a perjury prosecution in order to absolve their
accomplices. As the Supreme Court noted in Washington v. Texas,
"To think that criminals will lie to save their fellows but not to
obtain favors from the prosecution for themselves is indeed to
clothe the criminal class with more nobility than one might expect
to find in the public at large. ",234 Traditionally, concerns regarding
perjury have not been allowed to dictate what evidence will be
submitted to the jury. Our system of criminal justice places great
faith in the jury's ability to weigh and evaluate the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses. Fear of perjury should not dictate a rule
that would exclude potentially exculpatory evidence.
VI. JUDICIALLY ORDERED STATUTORY IMMUNITY
AND JUDICIALLY GRANTED IMMUNITY
Having established the existence of a constitutional right to
defense witness immunity under certain circumstances, it remains
to be determined what circumstances will require or permit the
grant of such immunity. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, in Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith,
235
established two different methods for obtaining defense witness im-
munity - judicially ordered and judicially granted 236 - and set
out requirements for each method. This section of this Note will
discuss the requirements as defined by the Third Circuit and at-
tempt to delineate the standards for possible future application.
A. JUDICIALLY ORDERED IMMUNITY
Prior to the Smith decision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit had established the right to judicially ordered
234. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967).
235. 615 F.2d964 (3d Cir. 1980).
236. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 968-72 (3d Cir. 1980). "Judicially
ordered immunity" refers to the situation recognized in United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d
Cir. 1976), and United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913
(1979). The court held that, because of prosecutorial misconduct, due process required that the
prosecution either request defense witness immunity or face acquittal. 535 F.2d at 229; 589 F.2d at
1204. In actuality, all statutory immunity is judicially ordered. The term is used in this section of
this Note to distinguish between statutory immunity ordered by the court and judicially fashioned
use immunity, which is referred to as "judicially grafited immunity."
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immunity. In United States v. Morrision, 2 37 the court held, under the
circumstances of that case, that due process required the Govern-
ment to request immunity for the defense witness or face an acquit-
tal. 238 In United States v. Herman, the court read Morrison as requiring
the defendant to show that the Government's action was taken
"with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding
process. "239 Later, in Smith, the court added the further
requirement that the defendant show that the evidence is
relevant. 240 Thus, to be entitled to an order requiring the Govern-
ment to request a grant of immunity for a defense witness or face an
acquittal, the defendant must establish that the witness's testimony
is relevant and that the government action resulting in the loss of
the witness's testimony was taken with the deliberate intention of
distorting the factfinding process. 24 1 The burden is clearly on the
defendant to establish these two elements, and while the applicable
burden of proof has not been articulated, the Herman court
suggested that inclusion of the second element required a sub-
stantial evidentiary showing, at least for reversaL 
242
1. Relevancy
The Smith court's discussion of the relevancy requirement for
judicially ordered immunity clearly indicates that the court did not
intend to impose a high materiality standard as a prerequisite for
such immunity. 243 Although the materiality standard the court in-
tended remains unclear, it is unlikely that mere relevance in the
evidentiary sense would suffice. 244 Both Morrison and Smith involved
237. 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
238. United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 1976).
239. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913
(1979).
240. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 969 (3d Cir. 1980). The court,
however, was careful to point out that "relevancy" did not require that the witness's testimony be
either clearly exculpatory or essential to the defendant's case. The court noted: "Immunity granted
under this theory need not be predicated upon a finding that the witness' testimony is clearly
exculpatory or otherwise essential to the defendant's case." Id. at 969 n.7.
241. Id. at 969.
242. 589 F.2d at 1204. "IWle think that the evidentiary showing required to justify reversal on
that ground must be a substantial one. The defendatit must be prepared to show that the
government's decisions were made with the deliberate intention ofdistorting thejudicial fact-finding
process. " Id.
243. See supra note 240.
244. In the strict evidentiary sense, "Irlelevant evidence means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EviD. 401.
It seems unlikely that the defense would be entitled to have a witness immunized merely because
that witness had some relevant evidence to present. It seems more probable that some higher
standard of materiality or need would be required. Even if mere evidentiary "relevance" is all that is
required, judicially ordered immunity would likely not be available unless the evidence were highly
relevant or material to a crucial issue. In situations in which the evidence is not highly relevant or
material to a crucial issue it would be difficult to show that the prosecutor was deliberately trying to
distort the factfinding process.
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testimony that was either crucial to the defense 245 or clearly ex-
culpatory, 24 6 thereby suggesting the possibility of a high materiality
standard. The Smith court, however, explicitly avoided such a high
standard.
247
Courts in the future will probably find evidence that is
cumulative 24 8 or that concerns the credibility of a witness on a
collateral matter 249 will not satisfy the materiality standard implicit
in the Smith relevancy requirement. Courts, however, should avoid
imposing high materiality standards similar to those set forth in
United States v. Agurs. 250 The standards of materiality articulated in
Agurs - whether the suppressed evidence might have affected the
outcome of the trial or created a reasonable doubt - relate to post-
trial review of the effect of the prosecution's withholding potentially
exculpatory evidence. 25 1 Those standards are inappropriate in an
immunity situation, in that they were specifically designed for
reviewing courts and necessarily require a post-trial evaluation of
the effect the excluded evidence may have had on the trial. 252 A
decision by the trial court to grant immunity based on prosecutorial
misconduct, however, necessarily becomes a pretrial or trial
decision, 253 and should not be held to the same standard as post-
trial review by an appellate court.
Smith and Herman make clear that the second element -
245. The witness the Government refused to immunize in Morrison would have testified that she,
and not the defendant, had been involved in the conspiracy to sell drugs. 535 F.2d at 225. The
witness's testimony, while not totally exculpatory of the defendant, would have shown that the
defendant's participation in the conspiracy was minimal. Id.
246. The testimony of the witness in Smith would have been clearly exculpatory as to three of the
defendants. 615 F.2d at 970.
247. Id. at 969 n.7.
248. See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 778 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 101 S. Ct. 856
(1981) (testimony would have been cumulative, immaterial, or impeaching only on collateral
matters).
249. Id. See also United States v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054, 1064 (2d Cir. 1979) (testimony
would have gone to witness credibility which, under the circumstances, was a collateral matter).
250. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
251. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text. The Court, in United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97 (1976), interpreted the standard of materiality in Brady as follows: "A fair analysis of the
holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the
suppressed evidence mzght have affected the outcome of the trial. "Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
The Agurs Court discussed the materiality standard in a situation in which the evidence was not
obviously exculpatory as follows: "The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding
concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. Such a finding is permissible only if supported by
evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. "Id. at 112 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Thus,
in the Agurs setting, the withholding of evidence does not violate due process unless the additional
evidence would be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. Id. at 112-13.
252. Although the Agurs Court recognized that the problem of withholding potentially
exculpatory evidence arises in two contexts-before trial and after trial-and that the same standard
for materiality applies in both contexts, 427 U.S. at 107-08, the Agurs standard, which requires that.
the omitted evidence create a reasonable doubt, is peculiarly designed for the post-trial context. Id. at
112-13.
253. In United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Pa. 1980), the court, although
awaiting the close of the Government's case before deciding whether to grant judicial immunity,
nevertheless recognized that the right should be afforded before trial "when the accused can still
marshal his resources to make the right actually, not just theoretically, a useful one." Id. at 417.
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whether the government action was taken with the deliberate in-
tention of distorting the fact finding process - should impose the
chief obstacle to judicially ordered immunity. 254 Because of the ex-
traordinary nature of defense witness immunity, the relevancy
requirement should include a materiality standard that reflects the
defendant's need for the evidence and relates to the central issue of
guilt or innocence. 255 In Roviaro v. United States, 256 the Supreme
Court considered the relevancy of the testimony of an unidentified
government informer. The Court applied a relevancy
requirement 257 to determine whether the informer's privilege was
outweighed by the "individual's right to prepare his defense. "258
In concluding that the informer's possible testimony would be
"highly relevant" and potentially helpful to the defense, the Court
discussed three possible ways in which the informer's testimony
could have been "relevant" to the defense. 259 First, because the in-
former had helped set up the drug transaction and was the defen-
dant's sole contact, his testimony might have disclosed en-
trapment. 260 Second, he was the only witness who might have
testified to the defendant's lack of knowledge of the contents of the
package. 261 Finally, the informer was the only person who could
contradict the testimony of the officer concealed in the trunk of the
car, 262 who was the Government's crucial witness in the case. 2
63
The standard of materiality used in Roviaro264 is equally ap-
plicable to the relevancy requirement for judicially ordered defense
witness immunity. Both situations properly require pretrial or trial
determinations, in which the defendant's access to evidence
necessary to the preparation of his defense is thwarted by the asser-
tion of a privilege. While the standard does not require the evidence
to be clearly exculpatory or essential to the defendant's case, it does
demand that the evidence not be otherwise available and that it
somehow relate to crucial issues in the case. Although testimony
going to the issue of factual guilt would clearly be relevant, the
254. See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 244.
256. 353 U.S. 53 (1957),
257. The Court held that "[wlhere the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of
his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair
determination ofa cause, the privilege must give way." Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-
61 (1957) (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 62.
259. Id. at 63-65.
260. Id. at 64.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 56.
263. Id. at 64.
264. That standard requires that the evidence be "relevant and helpful to the defense of the
accused, or . . . essential to a fair determination of a cause." Id. at 60-61. Evidence meeting this
standard would include the testimony of a witness or participant, at least when he is the sole material
witness for the defense. Id. at 64.
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materiality standard employed in Roviaro encompasses testimony
relevant to legal guilt2 65 as well. Moreover, testimony which goes to
the credibility of crucial government witnesses would also be
relevant under the materiality standard of Roviaro.
Therefore, while the relevancy requirement articulated in
Smith demands more than evidentiary relevance, it was not
designed to impose the chief obstacle to court-ordered immunity.
The materiality standard implicit in the relevancy requirement
should not be patterned after the high standards of Agurs, but
should be similar to the more relaxed standard adopted in Roviaro.
2. Deliberate Distortion of the Factfnding Process
It is clear that the second requirement for establishing a right
to judicially ordered immunity - that the governmental action
resulting in the loss of the witness's testimony was taken with the
deliberate intention of distorting the factfinding process - was
designed to impose a substantial burden on the defense. 266 The
Smith court, however, failed to articulate the burden of proof with
respect to this element, although it did indicate that in order to be
entitled to judicially granted immunity the defendant must
convincingly establish the prosecution's wrongful intent.26 7 On the
facts of Smith the court did, however, find that the defense had
made a prima facie showing entitling it to an evidentiary hearing
on the issues ofjudicially ordered statutory immunity and judicially
granted immunity. 268 Thus, in order to determine what constitutes
a prima facie showing of a deliberate intention to distort the
factfinding process, it is helpful to examine Smith and the factors the
court found persuasive on this issue. In addition, an examination of
Morrison and Herman may be useful to determine what specific
conduct might satisfy this requirement.
In Morrison, the court held that due process mandated that the
265. The Roviaro Court's discussion of the evidence as highly relevant because possibly bearing
on entrapment and lack of knowledge, clearly indicates that the Court was concerned with testimony
relevant to legal as well as factual guilt.
In a recent federal district court case involving a motion for defense witness immunity, the court
rejected the request, in part because the proffered testimony concerned the defendant's "lack of
knowledge," and the court felt that a witness other than a psychiatrist could not testify to another
person's state of mind. United States v. McMichael, 492 F. Supp. 205, 208 (D. Colo. 1980). This
decision is clearly inconsistent with the relevancy requirement set out in Smith,
266. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913
(1979).
267. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1980). Before a court
can grant defense witness immunity the "defendant must make a convincing showing sufficient to
satisfy the court that the testimony . . . is both clearly exculpatory and essential to the defendant's
case." Id.; see infra notes 316-25 and accompanying text.
268. 615 F.2d at 966.
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prosecution request immunity or suffer an acquittal when the
prosecutor by his threats and warnings had effectively driven the
defense witness from the stand. 269 Such conduct, under the Herman
reconstruction, evidenced a deliberate intention to distort the
factfinding process. 270 The court in Herman did not indicate why
there should be a distinction between a prosecutor's warning to a
witness that she would be subject to prosecution based on her
testimony, and the implicit threat of future prosecution every
witness faces. 27 1 Nevertheless, Smith and Herman make clear that the
loss of testimony must result from prosecutorial misconduct, 272 not
merely from the chilling effect posed by the implicit threat of future
prosecution.
In Herman, the court found no intention to distort the
factfinding process when the Government refused to request
immunity for the defense witness, against whom charges had been
dismissed without prejudice. 273 The court deemed it crucial that the
evidence established no relationship between the decision to grant
immunity to prosecution witnesses and not to defense witnesses.
274
The Herman court concluded that the defense had not met its
burden of showing that the prosecution's refusal to request defense
witness immunity was done with the deliberate intention of
distorting the factfinding process. 2
75
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
explicitly noted that the mere tendency of the prosecution to use its
discretion in granting immunity to make it more likely that
defendants will be convicted does not constitute prosecutorial
misconduct requiring judicially ordered immunity. 276 In Smith, the
court noted three factors which created a prima facie case of
prosecutorial misconduct: First, the prosecution's case was
inherently weak, resting mainly on the testimony of one witness;
second, the prosecution's refusal to request immunity resulted not
only in the loss of the witness's testimony, but furnished the basis
for the Government's objection to a prior favorable statement of the
witness; and finally, the Government's lack of jurisdiction over the
juvenile witness and its failure to justify its refusal to seek immunity
suggested that it deliberately intended to keep his testimony from
269. United States v Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 228-29 (3d Cir. 1976).
270. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913
(1979).
271. See Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91
HARV. L. REv. 1266, 1271 (1978).
272. See615 F.2d at 968.
273. 589 F.2d at 1199.
274. Id. at 1204.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1203-04; Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 968 (3d Cir. 1980).
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the jury.277 The court indicated that the crucial factor was the lack
of jurisdiction, coupled with the "highly relevant, and possibly
exculpatory" nature of the evidence. 2 78
Subsequent decisions have distinguished Smith as involving an
unusual or bizarre set of facts. 279 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United States v. Turkish, 280
distinguished Smith on the ground that in Smith the United States
Attorney had no jurisdiction over the juvenile witness and the
authorities with jurisdiction had agreed to a grant of immunity. 281
Based on this analysis, it appears that the prosecution must justify
its refusal to grant immunity if it does not have jurisdiction over the
witness and the authorities who do have jurisdiction consent to
immunity or do not intend to prosecute. Simply stated, if the
Government cannot establish an interest in future prosecution of
the witness, its refusal to seek immunity for a defense witness with
highly relevant evidence may constitute a prima facie showing of a
deliberate intention to distort the factfinding process. This analysis
would shift the burden to the prosecution to justify its refusal.2 82
The defendant, however, would bear the initial "substantial"
burden to show no interest in future prosecution of the witness.2 83
While it may be unfair to require the prosecution to
demonstrate a present intent to prosecute the witness for whom
immunity is sought, 284 it would not be unfair to require an in camera
disclosure to the court285 of an ability to prosecute or palpable
interest in future prosecution either by federal or state
277. 615 F.2d at 969.
278. Id.
279. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 773 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856
(1981); United States v. McMichael, 492 F. Supp. 205, 206 (D. Colo. 1980).
280. 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856 (1981).
281. Id. at 773.
282. Because questions of motivation are peculiarly within the knowledge of the prosecutor, it
would be unrealistic to require the defense to also prove that the refusal to request immunity was
unjustified. See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 5 343 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972). Just as courts often shift the burden of proof when proof of a negative fact is required,
see, e.g., DeRyder v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 Va. 602, __, 145 S.E.2d 177, 184 (1965),
similarly, when facts are peculiarly within the possession of the prosecution it should be forced to
come forward with evidence tojustify its refusal, once the defense has shown that the prosecution has
no palpable interest in a future prosecution of the witness. See also Government of Virgin Islands %.
Smith, 615 F.2d 964. 972-73 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing shifting burden in context of judicially
granted immunity).
283. See615 F.2d at 968.
284. See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856
(1981). As the Turkish court noted, the prosecution may not yet have enough evidence to seek
an indictment, but may want to keep the option of future prosecution open. Id. at 777.
285. An in camera proceeding would allow the prosecution to maintain the secrecy of any on-
going investigations, yet interpose a judicial determination as to the validity of the prosecution's
assertion that it or some other jurisdiction has a legitimate claim to future prosecution of the witness.
An in camera procedure was employed in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), and was
approved by the Court as necessary to a proper accommodation of the interests of the parties and the
various branches of government, given the assertion of executive privilege. Id. at 714-16.
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authorities. 28 6 Such a procedure would not unduly burden the
prosecution, and in cases in which the court determines that
immunity of the witness is required, the prosecution could use the
in camera procedure to "sterilize" its evidence against the witness
for future prosecution. 8 7
Accordingly, based on the factors considered in Morrison and
Smith, to establish a case of prosecutorial misconduct, the defense
must either show overt conduct by the prosecution resulting in the
witness's refusal to testify, or it must establish that the prosecution
has no interest in future prosecution of that witness. The degree of
relevance of the evidence will, of course, affect the prosecution's
burden of rebutting the defense's evidence. For example, if the
evidence is highly relevant and clearly exculpatory, the prosecution
should be required to meet a heavier burden to overcome the
defense's evidence that the Government has no interest in
prosecuting the witness. 2 8 8 Correspondingly, if the evidence is only
slightly relevant or helpful to the defense, the prosecution's rebuttal
burden should be lighter.
Application of this analysis to Earl v. United States,289 a case in
which the requested defense witness immunity was denied, will
emphasize how this analysis may affect similar cases. In Earl, the
defense sought immunity for a witness who had negotiated a guilty
plea to another transaction, and who remained subject to
prosecution for the transaction with which Earl had been charged.
The defense sought to adduce evidence that was highly relevant and
possibly exculpatory. According to the defense, the witness would
have testified that someone other than the defendant was with him
on the day of the drug transaction.2 9 0 To force the prosecution to
justify its refusal to immunize the witness, the defense would
initially have to show that the prosecution had no interest in future
prosecution of the witness. Although the witness remained subject
286. Because the State may also have an interest in prosecuting the witness, and because a
federal grant of immunity will impose upon the State Kastigar's heavy burden of proving that its
evidence was derived from sources independent of the immunized testimony, a strong showing of a
state interest in prosecution could justify a refusal to grant immunity. This would, of course,
necessitate some communication between state and federal authorities, a situation which could create
difficulties in proving that the State's evidence is not tainted if communications persist after the
testimony is taken. However, when the communication precedes the testimony no such problem
arises, and, in fact, knowledge by the State that immunized testimony is about to be given will allow
it to take precautions to ensure that its leads and investigation of the witness steer clear of his
immunized testimony.
287. See supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
288. Such a calculus was suggested by the court in Smith, when it noted that the most important
factor in its determination that the defense had made out a prima facie case of prosecutorial
misconduct was the absence of jurisdiction to prosecute the witness, coupled with the "highly
relevant, and possibly exculpatory" nature of the evidence. 615 F.2d at 969.
289. 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
290. Id. at 532.
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to future prosecution for the transaction at issue in the case, by
showing that the prosecutor had dismissed those charges in return
for a plea of guilty for an earlier transaction, the defense would shift
the burden to the prosecutor to justify his refusal to request
immunity for the witness. The prosecutor could presumably meet
that burden by demonstrating that another jurisdiction had an
interest in prosecuting the witness, or that despite its plea
agreement it continued to assert an interest in prosecuting the
witness. It is unlikely that the prosecutor could have met his burden
in Earl because the evidence was highly relevant,2 91  the
government had conditioned the plea agreement on dismissal of the
related charges,2 92 and the District of Columbia could not prosecute
the witness for the same offense.2 93 Therefore, judicially ordered
immunity would have been appropriate.
The prosecution rarely will be justified in refusing a defense
request for immunity for a witness with whom it has entered into a
plea agreement on related charges, unless another jurisdiction
demonstrates a strong interest in prosecution. Similarly, once the
witness has been tried and convicted on charges related to the same
transaction, immunity rarely should be denied.2 94  In such
instances, the prosecution has already publicly demonstrated that it
has no apparent interest in future prosecution of the witness, and in
most cases will be foreclosed from future prosecution by the double
jeopardy clause.
295
291. In Earl, the defense made a proffer that the witness, if granted immunity, would have
testified that he did not know the defendant, and that someone resembling the defendant was most
likely involved in the drug transaction. Id.
292. If the plea agreement with the witness in Earl rested to any significant degree on the
promise of the prosecutor not to initiate future prosecution for crimes arising out of the transacation
with which Earl was charged, the prosecutor would be bound by his promise. Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to hold that the individual
has a right to specific performance of the bargain even if it has not been totally consummated. See
Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 18 (4th Cir. 1979). But see Government of Virgin Islands v.
Scotland, 614 F.2d 360, 362 (3d Cir. 1980).
293. The Supreme Court has recognized the "dual sovereignty'.' doctrine in the double
jeopardy context. Thus, separate federal and state prosecutions for the same acts do not contravene
the bar of double jeopardy. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195-96 (1959); Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 132-36 (1959). The Court has, however, held that the dual sovereignty
doctrine does not permit separate prosecutions for the same offense by a municipality and the state,
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1970), or by the United States Government and a territory.
Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907). Therefore, the District of Columbia, being an
offspring of the federal government, would not have a separate interest in prosecuting the witness in
Earl. Cf Graves v. United States, 287 A.2d 524, 529 (D.C. 1972), vacated, 310 A.2d 857 (1973)
(discussing dual sovereignty doctrine with respect to the District of Columbia).
294. In the normal case, a conviction or guilty plea based on the very transaction for which the
witness's testimony is sought will result in a loss of the p ivilege against self-incrimination. A guilty
plea and a conviction ordinarily will erase any privilege with respect to the conduct on which they are
based. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 188 (1963); Reina v, United States, 364 U.S. 507, 513
(1960). There may, however, be situations in which the privilege is validly asserted in such contexts,
if, for example, the plea or conviction left the individual subject to prosecution for related offenses.
See, e.g., United States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212, 1218 (3d Cir. 1978). Thus, in most cases in
which the witness has pleaded guilty or been convicted prior to being called as a witness for the
defense the privilege will pose no obstacle to obtaining his testimony.
295. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (double jeopardy clause protects against
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B. JUDICIALLY GRANTED IMMUNITY
Perhaps the most novel and far-reaching aspect of the court's
decision in Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith is its holding that
courts themselves possess the inherent power to grant immunity to
defense witnesses.2 96 The court concluded that this inherent power
to grant use immunity derived from Simmons v. United States 97 and
other decisions, 298 which assumed the inherent power of the federal
courts to grant immunity to vindicate constitutional rights. 299 In
Simmons, the United States Supreme Court granted a form of use
immunity to the defendant for testimony given to establish fourth
amendment standing at a suppression hearing.300 In that context
the Court found it "intolerable that one constitutional right should
have to be surrendered in order to assert another. "301 Similarly, in
the context of defense witness immunity, courts have inherent
power to prevent the assertion of the witness's fifth amendment
privilege from resulting in the surrender of the defendant's due
process right to present exculpatory evidence. 30 2 Cognizant of
separation of powers considerations, the Smith court was careful to
minimize potential intrusion into prosecutorial prerogative by
delineating the standards under which judicial immunity could be
granted: "immunity must be properly sought in the district court;
the defense witness must be available to testify; the proffered
testimony must be clearly exculpatory; the testimony must be
second prosecution for same offense upon conviction).
296. 615 F.2d at 970-72. The first case to suggest the possibility of judicially granted use
immunity for defense witnesses was United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). One state court has recognized the court's right to grant
statutory immunity to a defense witness. State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App. 2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 890
(1974).
297. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
298. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 1978) (use immunity accorded
testimony of Congressman to protect his privilege under the Speech and Debate Clause); United
States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 332-33 (3d Cir. 1978) (use immunity accorded to defendant's
testimony in pretrial double jeopardy hearing).
299. 615 F.2d at 971.
300. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). Although the Court in Simmons did
not characterize its action as a form of use immunity, it has since acknowledged that Simmons "grants
a form of 'use immunity' " to allow criminal defendants to testify at suppression hearings to assert a
fourth amendment invasion. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 90 (1980).
301. 390 U.S. at 394.
302. In United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856 (1981),
the court distinguished the assertion of conflicting constitutional rights by different persons from the
situation in Simmons, in which the same person was forced to choose between potentially conflicting
rights. Id. at 776 n.4. The Supreme Court has recognized that the assertion of constitutional rights
by different individuals may result in conflict. Yet, the Court has noted that the "authors of the Bill
of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities" between those various rights "ranking one as
superior to the other." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) (first amendment
and sixth amendment rights). Instead, the Court found that it was unnecessary to establish a priority
among the various rights when alternatives existed to accommodate the competing interests. Id. at
561, 569-70. See also Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2830 n.18 (1980)




essential; and there must be no strong governmental interests
which countervail against a grant of immunity. "303
1. Immunity Must be Properly Sought and the Witness Must be
A vailable
The court in Smith indicated that an application for judicially
granted defense witness immunity in district court must name the
proposed witness and specify the particulars of that witness's
testimony. 30 4 In order to enable the court to appreciate the
significance of the excluded evidence, the application for immunity
must "clearly identify" the witness's testimony. 30 5 One court,
recently applying this standard, held that a letter from the witness's
attorney which suggested only by inference that the witness's
testimony would exculpate the defendant did not clearly identify
the witness's testimony. 30 6 The court also noted that the letter was
not based upon any recent conversation with the witness, but on
the witness's prior public statements. 30 7 Inferentially, the court
suggested that the defense could meet the requirement of
particularly identifying the witness's proposed testimony if the
application specified a recent statement made by the witness
himself. In Smith, the defense met this requirement by referring to
the witness's statement to the police which inculpated himself and
exculpated three of the defendants. 
3 08
At least one court has suggested that, to be timely, a motion
for judicially granted defense witness immunity must be made
before trial. 30 9 In addition, one court has held that, although the
motion should be ruled on before trial, a court may await the close
of the Government's case to decide whether to grant immunity.
310
When the defense is aware of potentially exculpatory evidence
which may be withheld by assertion of the fifth amendment
privilege, it should move for defense witness immunity before
trial. 311 If, however, the defense is not aware of the existence of the
303. 615 F.2d at 972 (footnote omitted).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 412, 414-15 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
307. Id. at 415.
308. 615 F.2d at 966-67, 974.
309. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 772 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856
(1981) (referring to district court's ruling denying immunity motion because it was not filed at the
beginning of that trial).
310. United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 412,417-18 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
311. A pretrial motion for immunity not only will assure that the motion is timely made, but will
also put the prosecution on notice that defense witness immunity may be granted. This advance
notice will allow the prosecution to assess the relative merits of prosecuting the defendant as opposed
to the witness, give it time to conduct an investigation of the witness, and, if necessary, provide it
with an opportunity to seek a postponement of the trial.
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potentially exculpatory evidence before trial, courts should permit
the defense to apply for witness immunity during trial.
3 12
Additionally, in order to make a proper application for judi-
cially granted defense witness immunity, the defense must show
that the witness is available. 313 "Available" presumably means
physically available; however, one court has suggested that an
assertion of privilege based on the speech and debate clause would
render the witness unavailable for the purpose of granting judicial
immunity. 314 It seems logical, however, that availability as a
requirement for seeking a grant of defense witness immunity
should be limited to physical availability, rather than availability in
the sense of failure or refusal to testify for whatever reason. Even if
some other privilege may be validly interposed, a grant of judicial
immunity would be virtually harmless and costless to the
prosecution. If immunity were granted and the witness refused to
testify or asserted some other privilege, the only cost to the
Government would be the time and effort expended to challenge
the defense motion for immunity. The Government would be in no
worse position to prosecute the witness than if immunity had never
been granted. Moreover, to require the defense to demonstrate that
the witness would not assert some other privilege, such as spousal
immunity, or generally refuse to testify in spite of the grant of
immunity, would impose an unrealistic burden on the defense and
require a degree of prescience not normally demanded. Because the
defense cannot guarantee that a witness, even if granted immunity,
will not stubbornly refuse to testify, it would be unrealistic to
impose a requirement of availability that demanded more than the
ability to produce the witness at trial.315
2. Testimony Must be Clearly Exculpatory and Essential to the
Defendant's Case
In addition to making proper application in the district court
312. Because Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), has been interpreted to impose no duty
to disclose the exculpatory evidence before trial, the defetise may not be aware of the need for defense
witness immunity until after the trial has begun. See, e.g., United States v. Alberico, 604 F.2d 1315,
1319 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979) (although nondisclosure was "troubling," Brady
was not violated since information was presented at trial); Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 118, 124 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976) (Brady not violated because evidence was introduced at
trial and there was no indication that defense could not have taken as much time as it needed to study
it during trial); United States v. Cole, 449 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 931
(1972) (no error where defendants were not informed of exculpatory information prior to trial, since
Brady dealt with disclosure at trial). But see State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 170 (N.D. 1974) (Brady
creates a duty of disclosure at time of demand, regardless of stage of proceedings).
313. Government ofVirgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1980).
314. United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 412, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
315. To aid in the production of witnesses the defense should be entitled to use all available
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and showing that the witness is available, the defense "must make
a convincing showing . . . that the testimony which will be
forthcoming is both clearly exculpatory and essential to the
defendant's case.' '316 Although the Smith court did not specify what
standard of proof constitutes a "convincing showing," 1 7 it is clear
that the crucial requirement for judicially granted immunity is a
showing that the evidence is essential and clearly exculpatory. 31 8 It
is also clear that evidence that is ambiguous, cumulative, or relates
only to the credibility of a government witness does not satisfy this
requirement.
31 9
The requirement that the evidence be essential to the
defendant's case incorporates necessity as a predicate for judically
granted immunity. Thus, judicially granted immunity should not
be available unless the defense can show a need for the proffered
testimony. 3 0 To establish the requisite need, the defense must
show that the witness intends to assert his privilege against self-
incrimination and that the evidence is not otherwise available.
Thus, if other witnesses could testify to the crucial evidence for
which immunity is sought, a grant of judicial immunity would be
inappropriate.
The defense must also establish that the proffered testimony
will be "clearly exculpatory. "321 The clearly exculpatory nature of
the evidence will necessarily depend on the facts of each case. In
this regard, it may be helpful to examine case law which has
determined whether particular evidence withheld by the
prosecution is "obviously exculpatory" as that term has been
defined in situations involving the prosecutor's duty to disclose.
322
Thus, evidence disclosing mistaken identity323 would be clearly
judicial resources. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 5 2241(c) (5) (1977) (authorizing writ of habeas corpus ad
testificandum).
316. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1980).
317. In United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Pa. 1980), without stating what would
constitute a "convincing showing," the court stated that "while the burden here rests upon the
defendants, that burden need not be met by any prescribed standards, such as beyond a reasonable
doubt, by a preponderance of the evidence, or even by establishing that what they seek is more likely
so than not so." Id. at 416.
318. 615 F.2d at 972 n.l 1.
319. Id. at 972.
320. In United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1978), the court concluded that the
defense failed to demonstrate a need for defense witness immunity because it did not show that the
witness would invoke the fifth amendment if put on the stand. Id. at 561.
321. 615 F.2d at 972.
322. In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the Court read Brady as holding that the
prosecution has a constitutional duty to disclose obviously exculpatory evidence even if not requested
to do so by the defense. Id. at 107.
323. The court in Smith found that testimony relating to the mistaken identity of three of the
defendants would have been clearly exculpatory. See 615 F.2d at 970. But cf. Earl v. United States,
361 F.2d 531, 532, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967) (no due process right to
defense witness immunity despite testimony which would have shown mistaken identity).
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exculpatory, as would alibi testimony. 324  Statements by co-
participants disclosing the defendant's relative lack of involvement,
while highly relevant and perhaps clearly exculpatory with respect
to certain degrees of criminal offenses, would present a closer
question. 3
25
3. No Strong Countervailing Governmental Interest
The court in Smith also concluded that once the defendant has
met the foregoing requirements for a grant of judicial immunity,
the burden shifts to the prosecution to either rebut the defendant's
showing or establish a strong countervailing governmental interest
for denying the requested immunity. 326 The governmental interest
in future prosecution of this witness clearly presents the strongest,
and perhaps the only countervailing interest that would justify a
denial of the application for defense witness immunity. 327 Assertion
of an interest in future prosecution alone, however, will not satisfy
the Government's burden. 328  As the Smith court noted, the
Government's ability to prosecute the witness and to meet the
heavy burden of Kastigar3 2 9 may be preserved by sterilizing the
witness's testimony, by granting a continuance to allow the
Government to gather and marshal its evidence against the witness,
or by any other option which would further the same purpose.
330
Moreover, if any option is available to the Government, it cannot
meet its burden of establishing a strong countervailing
governmental interest, and a grant of judicial immunity would be
inappropriate.
331
324. Alibi testimony would qualify for immunity if the defendant was observed elsewhere a[ lIe
time of the crime by a witness who was himself engaged in a crime or who feared that his testimony
might implicate him in a crime or furnish a link to a crime.
325. This was essentially the question presented in United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d
Cir. 1976), in which the court found a right to judicially ordered, as opposed to judicially granted,
immunity. Id. at 225.
326. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 973 (3d Cir. 1980).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See supra notes 209-22 and accompanying text.
330. 615 F.2d at 973. Although not discussed by the court in Smith, one option which is clearly
available to the prosecution if it intends to prosecute the witness is to reverse the order of trials and
try the witness first.
331. In certain situations it may be easier to obtain judicially granted immunity than judically
ordered immunity. In order to be eligible for judicially ordered immunity, the defense must show a
deliberate intention on the part of the prosecution to distort the fact finding process. United States v.
Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). While the materiality
requirement forjudically ordered immunity is lower than that for judicially granted immunity. 615
F.2d at 969 n.7, the defense burden to show governmental misconduct may be difficult to meet. See
United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 412, 415, 419 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (dismissing motion for
statutory immunity with prejudice, but without prejudice forjudicial immunity).
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(. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF DEFENSE WITNESS
IMMUNITY
Although the court in Smith articulated the standards to govern
grants of defense witness immunity, it generally left unresolved
questions relating to its practical implementation. The Smith court
did indicate, however, that whether the court grants or denies
immunity it should carefully explain the basis for its ruling. 332 The
court, however, did not state whether the trial court's ruling on the
application for immunity would fall within the "collateral order"
doctrine 33 and therefore be appealable before trial.
Additionally, Smith leaves unanswered questions regarding the
actual implementation of the procedure for receiving evidence on a
motion for defense witness immunity. Smith clearly requires an
evidentiary hearing of some sort. 334 It is not clear, however,
whether the various stages of the proceedings may be conducted ex
parte or whether both sides must be present. For example, the
defense may be unwilling to reveal its theory of the case in advance
of trial and before the presentation of the Government's case. Such
a revelation may be necessary, however, if the defense is to
establish that the proffered testimony of the witness is essential to its
case. Similarly, the Government may be reluctant to disclose the
status of on-going investigations. Disclosure of such investigations,
however, may be required to show that it has an interest in future
prosecution of the witness and that no options exist to preserve that
interest. To accommodate these concerns courts may employ a
procedure similar to that used in determining whether to require
the prosecution to reveal an informer's identity. 335 Other suggested
procedures include in camera examination of the prospective witness
by the trial judge, outside of the presence of both the prosecution
and defense. 336 Such a procedure has two distinct advantages.
First, it allows the court to ascertain if the testimony is clearly
exculpatory and essential to the defense; and second, it provides a
332. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F,2d 964, 973 (3d Cir. 1980).
333. Generally, only final judgments are appealable in the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1977). Thus, interlocutory orders are generally not appealable because they are not final. The
Supreme Court however, has created an exception to the finality requirement for orders which are
collateral to the main proceeding. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949).
The Court has recently had the opportunity to rule on two pretrial orders in criminal cases, holding
that denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds falls within the collaterial order
exception of Cohen, Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1977), but that a denial of a
similar motion on speedy trial grounds does not fall within the exception. United States v.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850. 853-56 (1978).
334. 615 F.2d at 974.
335. See Note, Separation of Powers and Defense Witness Immunity, 66 GEo. L.J. 51, 79 (1977).
336. See Note, "The Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence" The Defendant's Constitutional
Right to Witness Immunity, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1211, 1240-41 (1978).
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means, through use of a sealed record, for meaningful judicial
review of the trial court's decision. An in camera hearing alone,
however, will not enable the court to determine whether the
government can establish a strong interest in not granting
immunity and the unavailability of options to preserve a future
prosecution of the witness. Thus, although an in camera
examination of the witness may provide a useful adjunct to the
evidentiary hearing envisioned by the court in Smith, it cannot by
itself provide for the requisite determination that must be made to
ascertain whether a grant ofjudicial immunity is appropriate under
the Smith guidelines.
Other issues not addressed by the Smith court include the
following: (1) The extent to which the trial court, in granting
immunity, should limit the scope of questions that may be asked of
the witness; 337 and (2) the procedures that might be used to sterilize
the witness's testimony and evidence that the prosecution has
already gathered against the witness for use in a future prosecution.
Moreover, the court did not discuss, let alone suggest, a procedure
allowing state prosecutors to intervene to establish a strong
countervailing state interest in future prosecution of the witness.
While these unanswered questions suggest problems for the future
of defense witness immunity, they are not insurmountable given
the availability of procedures used in analogous contexts. 33 8 The
guidelines and standards for granting and ordering immunity for
defense witnesses have been set down and await further explication
and embellishment. Despite the potential problems and questions
of proper application of the guidelines, a framework has been
established for dealing with and accomodating the assertion of
conflicting constitutional rights, the clash of interests between the
prosecution and the defense, and the conflict between prosecutorial
prerogative and judicial authority as they converge in the setting of
a criminal trial.
VII. CONCLUSION
The right to defense witness immunity, hinted at in a footnote
in Earl v. United States, has finally been recognized. While it would
be an overstatement to suggest that the right is well established, it is
clear, even from those cases rejecting the need for defense witness
immunity on their particular facts, that most courts would
recognize the right under certain circumstances. The United States
337. Id.
338. Seesupra note 335 and accompanying text.
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Government of Virgin
Islands v. Smith, established guidelines for applying the right. Those
guidelines represent a first step toward defining the circumstances
in which courts may implement the right to defense witness
immunity. The question facing courts in the future is no longer
whether a right to defense witness immunity exists, but rather when
that right should be applied.
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